The Prosecution of Non-Disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time to Rethink Cuerrier by Grant, Isabel
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2011
The Prosecution of Non-Disclosure of HIV in
Canada: Time to Rethink Cuerrier
Isabel Grant
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, grant@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
Isabel Grant, "The Prosecution of Non-Disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time to Rethink Cuerrier" (2011) 5:1 McGill JL & Health 7.
   
 
 
McGill Journal of Law and Health ~ Revue de droit et santé de McGill 
 
THE PROSECUTION OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF HIV IN 
CANADA: TIME TO RETHINK CUERRIER 
Isabel Grant * 
 
                                                   
*  Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. I would like to thank 
the Foundation for Legal Research for its generous support and Stephanie 
Melnychuk and Shirley Smiley for their help editing this paper. Special thanks to 
Emily MacKinnon for her tireless research assistance and her ongoing dedication 
to this project. Thanks also to Jonathan Glenn Betteridge for his insightful 
comments and to the anonymous reviewers who provided helpful suggestions.  
© Isabel Grant 2011 
Citation: Isabel Grant, “The Prosecution of Non-disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time to 
Rethink Cuerrier” (2011) 5:1 MJLH 7. 
Référence : Isabel Grant,  « The Prosecution of Non-disclosure of HIV in Canada: 
Time to Rethink Cuerrier » (2011) 5 : 1 RDSM 7. 
The author of this article argues that Canada’s 
current approach to the criminalization of HIV 
transmission is deeply flawed and cries out for 
clarification. The article first considers the 
risk of transmission of HIV under various 
conditions, as determined by recent scientific 
studies, and concludes that HIV is not easily 
transmissible through sexual activity. It next 
examines several crucial factors that contrib-
ute to the significance, or lack of significance, 
of sexual activity by HIV-positive individuals, 
concluding that the current law creates a 
“numbers game” for triers of fact. The article 
then proceeds to a comparative analysis of 
other Commonwealth countries, demonstrat-
ing that Canada is unique in the scale of its 
prosecution of HIV transmission, as well its 
reliance on assault, sexual assault, and mur-
der-related charges.  The article concludes by 
examining several specific problems with the 
Cuerrier test, and proposes future directions 
which the Supreme Court could consider. 
 
 
L’auteure de cet article suggère que 
l’approche canadienne courante de criminali-
sation de la transmission du VIH est défail-
lante et demande d’être. L’article considère 
d’abord le risque de transmission du VIH sous 
plusieurs conditions telles que déterminées par 
des études scientifiques récentes pour con-
clure que le VIH ne se transmet pas facile-
ment par l’activité sexuelle. Ensuite, l’auteure 
examine plusieurs facteurs cruciaux qui  dé-
terminent l’importance ou l’insignifiance de 
l’activité sexuelle d’un individu séropositif. 
Elle en conclut que le droit courant crée un jeu 
de nombre pour les juges de faits. L’article 
procède ensuite à une analyse comparative 
avec d’autres pays du Commonwealth pour 
démontrer que le Canada en ce qui a trait au 
nombre de ses poursuites relatives à la trans-
mission du VIH, ainsi que pour sa tendance à 
fonder de telles actions sur des accusations de 
voies de fait, d’agression sexuelle et de 
meurtre. L’article se termine en examinant 
plusieurs problèmes propres au test de Cuerri-
er et propose certaines directions que la Cour 
suprême pourrait considérer ultérieurement.
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Introduction 
 Canada has witnessed one of the highest levels of prosecution for the non-
disclosure of HIV status to one’s sexual partners of any developed country in 
the world. We also have the dubious distinction of being the only country to 
witness first-degree murder convictions in a non-disclosure case where two of 
the complainants died of AIDS.1 This paper examines the role of the courts in 
this process, tracing some of the current problems back to the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in R v Cuerrier.2 Specifically, this paper considers how 
Cuerrier has been interpreted in subsequent cases in light of the scientific de-
velopments in the field of HIV/AIDS and suggests an alternative, more re-
strained approach to prosecuting these offences.   
 The Supreme Court of Canada in Cuerrier held that not disclosing one’s 
HIV-positive status to a sexual partner could constitute fraud which would vi-
tiate consent to sexual activity, provided there was a significant risk of serious 
bodily harm to the complainant.3 At the time of Cuerrier, when highly active 
antiretroviral treatments (HAART) for HIV were in their infancy, HIV almost 
inevitably led to AIDS and premature death; therefore, the risk of transmission 
of HIV was always going to be considered a significant risk of serious harm. 
Further, because the Court held that this risk “endangered life” even where the 
virus was not transmitted, a finding of aggravated assault was made out. The 
way in which the Court used sexual assault to build the elements of aggravated 
assault in Cuerrier opened the door to charges of either aggravated assault or 
aggravated sexual assault in the vast majority of subsequent cases. Not every 
jurisdiction takes such an expansive approach to criminalization. As will be 
discussed below, England and Wales, for example, only criminalizes inten-
tional or reckless transmission of the virus. 
 More than 10 years after Cuerrier, certain dilemmas in prosecuting non-
disclosure of one’s HIV-positive status cry out for clarification by Canada’s 
highest court. Can juries continue to make decisions about the level of risk on 
a case-by-case basis without further elaboration by appellate courts as to the 
significant risk standard? Triers of fact are given no standards to follow, just 
numbers and probabilities from which they must determine the significance of 
                                                   
1 See discussion in R v Aziga, 2010 ONSC 3683, [2010] OJ No 2763 (QL) (Johnson 
Aziga was convicted by a jury of “two counts of first degree murder, ten counts of 
aggravated sexual assault, and one count of attempted aggravated sexual assault” 
at para 2). 
2 R v Cuerrier, [1998] 2 SCR 371, 127 CCC (3d) 1 [Cuerrier cited to SCR]. 
3 This formulation will be referred to as the “Cuerrier test” in this paper. 
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the risk. Leaving this assessment in the hands of juries inevitably creates un-
certainty about how thresholds of risk are applied, resulting in inconsistent 
outcomes and a lack of clarity in the law.4 What are the justifications for crim-
inalizing non-disclosure where the virus is not actually transmitted? Should we 
be using two of our most serious offences against the person in cases where no 
bodily harm is caused? If the virus is not transmitted, how much risk is signifi-
cant enough to justify serious criminal liability? If, for example, the risk of 
transmission is 1 in 10,000, can we really say that life is endangered?  
 The Cuerrier Court could not have foreseen all the possible factors that 
play into determining whether a risk of serious bodily harm is significant. Nor 
did it foresee the extent to which any threat of transmitting HIV would come to 
be seen as significant in future cases. In this paper, I will argue that the way 
courts have interpreted Cuerrier has left us with too broad and too uncertain a 
test for criminalization of non-disclosure. It will be argued that it is time for a 
new approach to non-disclosure prosecutions, an approach that takes into ac-
count the rapid scientific developments that have changed our understanding 
of, and ability to treat, HIV, and that distinguishes between cases in which the 
virus is transmitted and those in which it is not. It will be argued that the rec-
ord of HIV prosecutions in Canada is a disturbing one, and that it is essential 
that we find a way to prosecute only the most flagrant and serious cases that 
involve an ongoing pattern of non-disclosure. Two recent appellate decisions 
have signalled a more cautious approach to criminalization, although both ex-
plicitly urged reconsideration by the Supreme Court of Canada.5 
 Part I of this paper sets out a brief summary of the literature on rates of 
sexual transmission of HIV to demonstrate both that HIV is not easily trans-
missible through sex and that we have the means to reduce these rates even 
further. Part II then examines recent developments in the case law to demon-
strate how lower courts have interpreted the significant risk of serious bodily 
harm test. I examine each of the factors with which judges and juries have 
been confronted in assessing the degree of risk in a particular case and discuss 
the difficulties inherent in applying a legal standard to statistical probabilities. 
Part III provides a brief review of three other Commonwealth jurisdictions, 
                                                   
4 Even within a province there can be inconsistency: R v Wright, 2009 BCCA 514, 
287 BCAC 1, 256 CCC (3d) 254 [Wright]; R v JAT, 2010 BCSC 766 [JAT]. There 
is also inconsistency between provinces, compare Wright; R v DC, 2010 QCCA 
2289 [DC (CA)]. 
5 R v Mabior, 2010 MBCA 93, 258 ManR (2d) 166, [2011] 2 WWR 211, leave to ap-
peal to SCC granted, 33976 (5 May 2011) [Mabior (CA)]; DC (CA), ibid, leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has been granted, 34094 (26 August 
2011). 
2011 
 
THE PROSECUTION OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF HIV IN CANADA: 
TIME TO RETHINK CUERRIER 
11 
 
 
demonstrating that the expansive Canadian approach is not the only option for 
dealing with non-disclosure. From this analysis, I move on to argue in Part IV 
that the significant risk of serious bodily harm test has not served us well in 
Canada, in part because lower courts have ignored the caution expressed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Cuerrier, and in part because the test fails to 
distinguish between levels of culpability and levels of harm. The result has 
been the over-criminalization of persons with HIV who have not disclosed 
their HIV-positive status to their sexual partners, a development that contrib-
utes to the demonization of persons with HIV. I have elsewhere reviewed the 
arguments for and against criminalization.6 In this paper, I accept that some 
level of criminalization is virtually inevitable in Canada. However, it is not too 
late to re-assess Canada’s aggressive approach and to rethink the Cuerrier 
test.7 Part V argues that aggravated assault and aggravated sexual assault 
should be reserved for the most serious cases, in which transmission of the vi-
rus takes place and there is a pattern of non-disclosure demonstrating a reck-
less disregard for the consequences to others. Where prosecution is necessary 
in cases involving no transmission of the virus, less serious offences—such as 
common nuisance or (sexual) assault—are more appropriate than a serious 
consequence crime. Prosecutions should not be undertaken where a condom 
was used consistently, or where there is clear evidence of an undetectable viral 
load.   
 While Cuerrier applies to any sexually transmitted infection, there are only 
a handful of Canadian cases involving charges outside the context of HIV.8 
                                                   
6 Isabel Grant, “The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The Criminalization of the Non-
disclosure of HIV” (2008) 31 Dal LJ 123 at 172 [Grant, “The Boundaries of the 
Criminal Law”].  
7 Indeed, leave to appeal has been granted in two recent cases: Mabior (CA), supra 
note 5 and DC (CA), supra note 4.  
8 See R v Jones, (2002) NBQB 340, [2002] NBJ No 375 (QL) [Jones] (where the ac-
cused was acquitted because the risk of transmission of hepatitis C was too low); 
“Man with Hepatitis B Jailed for Sexual Assault” CBC News (3 March 2010) 
online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-
island/story/2010/03/03/pei-hepatitis-women-sexual-assault.html>; Megan Gillis, 
“Soldier Banned from Sex Unless He Warns of Herpes” Ottawa Sun (18 February 
2010) online: Ottawa Sun <www.ottawasun.com/news/ottawa/ 
2010/02/18/12937306.html> (accused charged with six counts of aggravated sex-
ual assault and six counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm); “Redou-
bling Global Efforts to Support HIV/AIDS and Human Rights” (2010) online: 
HIV/AIDS Policy and Law Review <www.aidslaw.ca/ publica-
tions/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=1775> (an Ontario case where a man was 
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The criminalization of nondisclosure is really about HIV/AIDS, a condition 
that has been stigmatized, and its victims marginalized, since its emergence in 
North America just decades ago. Throughout the legal analysis, we must ask 
ourselves why our criminal justice system has taken such an extraordinarily 
harsh approach in this context, but not with illnesses that are much more easily 
transmitted. 
I.  The Risk of Sexual Transmission of HIV  
 Before examining the factors that contribute to significant risk, it is useful 
to establish the general risk of sexual transmission of HIV. Contrary to public 
opinion, HIV is not generally an easily transmissible virus through sexual ac-
tivity. The following estimates on the risk of sexual transmission are approxi-
mate and do not take into account factors that alter the risk in individual cases. 
Furthermore, the results from different studies vary considerably, so they 
should not be taken as being definitive. Estimated risk and the methodology 
used to measure it are topics of ongoing debate within the field.9 
 In a systematic review and meta-analysis, one study found that for unpro-
tected anal intercourse, where the insertive partner is HIV-positive, there is an 
average 1 in 71 per-act probability that the receptive partner will contract 
HIV.10 Few studies have considered the per-act risk of transmission for unpro-
tected anal intercourse where the receptive partner is HIV-positive. One study 
found the per-act risk to be as low as 1 in 1,666,11 but that study was excluded 
from the meta-analysis due to methodological concerns.12 For vaginal inter-
course, the average risk in high-income countries has been identified by a me-
ta-analysis as 1 in 1,250 per act that a man will transmit the virus to his female 
      
convicted of assault and sentenced to 12 months in prison for not disclosing that 
he carried the herpes virus).  
9 Marie-Claude Boily et al, “Heterosexual Risk of HIV-1 Infection per Sexual Act: 
Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Observational Studies” (2009) 9:2 The 
Lancet Infectious Diseases 118 at 126-127. 
10 Rebecca F Baggaley, Richard G White & Marie-Claude Boily, “HIV Transmission 
Risk Through Anal Intercourse: Systematic Review, Meta-Analysis and Implica-
tions for HIV Prevention” (2010) 39 International Journal of Epidemiology 1048 
at 1048, 1051. 
11 Eric Vittinghoff et al, “Per-Contact Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Transmission Between Male Sexual Partners” (1999) 150:3 American Journal of 
Epidemiology 306.  
12 Baggaley, White & Boily, supra note 10 at 1050. 
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partner, and 1 in 2,500 that a female partner will transmit the virus to her male 
partner.13 
 It has been estimated that the use of condoms in sexual activity further re-
duces the above risks by an average of 80%.14 Since this figure includes im-
proper and inconsistent use, studies examining the risk associated with protect-
ed intercourse have found that the risk is even lower. According to the expert 
in R v JAT, the risk during anal intercourse where the insertive partner is HIV-
positive drops to 1 in 1,666 when a condom is used.15 Other studies have found 
that with condom use, the risk of transmission in vaginal sex decreases to 1 in 
10,000 for the woman16 and 1 in 20,000 for the man.17 
 Furthermore, there is consensus among experts that the lower the viral 
load, the lower the risk of transmission. An undetectable viral load (identified 
as below 40 copies per millilitre of blood by many HIV/AIDS treatment guide-
lines) has been estimated to reduce the risk of transmission to, at most, 1 in 
8,620 for male-to-female vaginal transmission.18 Where a viral load is sup-
pressed as a result of HAART, the risk of transmission has been found to be 
reduced by 92%.19 The risk that accompanies an undetectable viral load is so 
low that, in 2008, leading experts in Switzerland stated that the virus is essen-
tially impossible to transmit (absent other risk factors).20 The combined effect 
                                                   
13 Boily, supra note 9 at 118. 
14 Susan C Weller & Karen Davis-Beaty, “Condom Effectiveness in Reducing Heter-
osexual HIV Transmission” (2002) 1 Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 
at 2. 
15 JAT, supra note 4 at para 29. 
16 Steven D Pinkerton & Paul R Abramson, “Effectiveness of Condoms in Preventing 
HIV Transmission” (1997) 44:9 Social Science & Medicine 1303 at 1310. 
17 Carol L Galletlyn & Steven D Pinkerton, “Toward Rational Criminal HIV Expo-
sure Laws” (2004) 32:2 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 327 at 328. 
18 David P Wilson et al, “Relation Between HIV Viral Load and Infectiousness: A 
Model-based Analysis” (2008) 372:9635 The Lancet 314 at 315, table 1 (this rep-
resents a worst-case estimate, and there is a 95% chance that the true likelihood of 
transmission is even less likely than 1 in 8,620). 
19 Deborah Donnell et al, “Heterosexual HIV-1 Transmission After Initiation of An-
tiretroviral Therapy: a Prospective Cohort Analysis” (2010) 375:9731 The Lancet 
2092. 
20 Pietro Vernazza et al, “Les personnes séropositives ne souffrant d'aucune autre 
MST et suivant un traitement antirétroviral efficace ne transmettent pas le VIH par 
voie sexuelle” (2008) 89:5 Bulletin des médecins Suisses 165 online: Aide Suisse 
contre le SIDA <www.aids.ch/f/hivpositiv/pdf/SAZ_f.pdf> (this finding was 
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of the above-cited research is that if the HIV-positive person has an undetecta-
ble viral load and a condom is used, the risk of transmission is infinitesimally 
low. 
 The risk of sexual transmission is also affected by a number of other varia-
bles including whether the infected partner has other sexually transmitted dis-
eases and whether a man, engaged as the insertive sexual partner, is circum-
cised. 21 
II. The Nature of Significant Risk 
 Since Cuerrier, courts have been faced with the need to assess the nature 
of the risk of HIV transmission in the particular activity in question. Factors 
not contemplated in Cuerrier, such as viral load and the type of sexual activity, 
have come to play a significant part in such prosecutions. Yet different expert 
witnesses rely on different numbers, as our knowledge of sexual transmission 
risks is far from precise. The following section examines some of the factors 
that judges and juries consider in their calculations of whether the accused cre-
ated a significant risk of serious bodily harm to the complainant. 
A. Condoms 
 The one factor that decreases the risk of harm that was anticipated in Cuer-
rier was condom use. Justice Cory, writing for the majority, made a fairly 
strong statement–albeit in obiter–suggesting that careful condom use might 
negate fraud:  
To have intercourse with a person who is HIV-positive will al-
ways present risks. Absolutely safe sex may be impossible. Yet 
the careful use of condoms might be found to so reduce the risk 
      
based on monogamous relationships, adherence to HAART, and the absence of 
other sexually transmitted infections; this statement caused significant controver-
sy, largely due to the fear that it would encourage risk-taking behaviour). Testi-
mony based on this statement caused a Geneva court to find that an accused man 
posed no risk: Cour de la justice (chambre pénal), Geneva, 23 February 2009, 
[2009] ACJP 60 (an English translation of the judgment is available online: 
AIDSLEX <www.aidslex.org/site_documents/CR-0066E.pdf>). 
21 Robert C Bailey et al, “Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in Young Men in 
Kisumu, Kenya: A Randomised Controlled Trial” (2007) 369:9562 The Lancet 
643; Helen A Weiss et al, “Male Circumcision and Risk of HIV Infection in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis” (2000) 14:15 AIDS 
2361. 
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of harm that it could no longer be considered significant so that 
there might not be either deprivation or a risk of deprivation.22 
 Justice McLachlin (as she then was) explicitly stated in her concurring mi-
nority judgment that her test for fraud negating consent to sex would not apply 
to protected sex because there must be a high risk or probability of transmitting 
the disease to warrant criminalization.23 The Court in Cuerrier was conscious 
of the dangers of over-criminalization and stressed the gravity of the conse-
quences of a conviction and the importance of not trivializing the offence.24 
 Some courts have interpreted Cuerrier to mean that only unprotected sex is 
criminalized. In R v Agnatuk-Mercier, both counsel agreed that the Crown had 
to prove that the alleged intercourse was unprotected.25 In R v Edwards, the 
trial judge made an even stronger statement in favour of only criminalizing 
unprotected sex: 
It is not for a trial judge to expand what constitutes a criminal 
act. Such a determination is for the Legislature or the Supreme 
Court of Canada in its interpretation of Legislation. The gay 
community and its leaders vigorously urge the practice of safe 
sex, not abstinence. If the failure to disclose a contagious disease 
before engaging in ‘protected’ sex is to be a criminal offence, it 
is for the Legislature to so define such activity.26 
 In the highly-publicized case of football player Trevis Smith, the trial 
judge took the same approach: “I have to go on and satisfy myself beyond a 
reasonable doubt that if he did have sex that that sex was unprotected sex.”27 In 
R c DC, the trial judge determined that the crucial question for the vitiation of 
consent was whether the intercourse was protected or unprotected.28 
                                                   
22 Supra note 2 at para 129 [emphasis added].  
23 In fact, transmission is never “probable” in the sense of more likely than not from a 
few acts of unprotected intercourse. Professor Ferguson interprets Cuerrier as 
holding that disclosure is not required in the context of protected sex: Gerry Fer-
guson, “Failure to Disclose HIV-Positive Status and Other Unresolved Issues in 
Williams” (2004 ) 20:1 CR (6th) 42 at 48. 
24 Supra note 2 at paras 132, 137. 
25 [2001] OJ No 4729 (QL). 
26 2001 NSSC 80 at para 25, 194 NSR (2d) 107, 50 WBC (2d) 255 [Edwards]. 
27 R v Smith, [2007] SJ No 116 (QL) (SKQB) at para 59, aff’d on other grounds 2008 
SKCA 61, 310 Sask R 230 [Smith]. 
28 2008 QCCQ 629, JE 2008-515 [DC (CQ)]. 
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 Some courts have gone out of their way to narrow the scope of Justice 
Cory’s statement in Cuerrier. In an appeal from a committal to stand trial, R v 
JT, the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated that Cuerrier had not estab-
lished that only unprotected sex gives rise to the duty to disclose.29 Focusing 
on Justice Cory’s use of the word “might” in the paragraph quoted above, Jus-
tice Donald stated, “I think the language acknowledges that it is a question of 
evidence whether in any given prosecution the risk is significant,” implying 
that conviction could be possible even if a condom was used.30 In R v Wright, 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal cited JT in finding that it is a question of 
fact whether condom use reduces risk below the significant level required to 
vitiate consent.31 In a puzzling variation, an Ontario court acquitted an accused 
of aggravated sexual assault when the Crown was unable to prove that the in-
tercourse was unprotected, but the accused was instead convicted of the in-
cluded offence of sexual assault.32 The judge held that the lack of disclosure vi-
tiated consent, without ever considering whether there was a significant risk of 
serious bodily harm, as required by the Cuerrier test.33 
 Other courts have simply ignored the question of condom use. In R v Me-
konnen,34 the Court disregarded the fact that the three acts of vaginal inter-
course between the accused and the complainant all involved the use of a con-
dom. The accused and the complainant met in a hotel on three occasions and 
engaged in three acts of protected intercourse and one instance of fellatio that 
may or may not have been protected. The judge gave no weight to the fact that 
a condom was used during the three acts of vaginal intercourse. According to 
the judge, counsel agreed “that if I find that Mr. Mekonnen had sexual rela-
tions with [the complainant] without telling her that he was HIV positive then 
the case is made out.”35 The accused was convicted of aggravated sexual as-
sault for three acts of protected intercourse where the virus was not transmit-
ted. In R c Parenteau, although there was conflicting evidence about condom 
                                                   
29 2008 BCCA 463, 288 BCAC 1, 256 CCC (3d) 246 [JT]. 
30 Ibid at para 19. 
31 Wright, supra note 4 at para 39. 
32 R v Felix, 2010 ONCJ 322, [2010] OJ No 3371 (QL). 
33 Ibid at paras 71-72.  
34 2009 ONCJ 643, [2009] OJ No 5766 (QL) [Mekonnen].  
35 Ibid at para 40. 
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use, the judge stated that the sole issue was whether or not the accused had 
disclosed his status before the first occasion of intercourse.36 
 The trial and appeal decisions in R v Mabior,37 a complicated case involv-
ing multiple complainants, several of whom were teenagers, highlight the dif-
ferent approaches taken by courts regarding the question of condom use. The 
trial judge held that condom use alone was insufficient to reduce the risk to a 
level that was not significant. Mabior was complicated by the fact that the ac-
cused did not appear to use condoms consistently (he had a sexually transmit-
ted infection) or carefully (there was evidence of condoms falling off and sex 
while both partners were highly intoxicated). Relying on expert evidence that 
condoms are only 80% reliable and only reduce HIV transmission by 80%, the 
trial judge found that consent is still vitiated if a condom is used by an HIV-
positive person whose viral load is detectable: only the combination of an un-
detectable viral load and the use of a condom preclude liability. I have sug-
gested elsewhere that this may have resulted from the trial judge’s misappre-
hension about the 80% figure.38 While condoms may be only 80% reliable, it 
does not follow that there is a 20% risk of transmission when a condom is 
used. As was discussed above, the risk of transmission is extremely low for 
protected sex and almost non-existent when a condom is combined with an 
undetectable viral load. It is noteworthy that none of the complainants in Ma-
bior has tested positive for HIV.  
 The Manitoba Court of Appeal took a more restrained approach, recogniz-
ing that “criminal sanctions should be reserved for those deliberate, irresponsi-
ble, or reckless individuals who do not respond to public health directives and 
who are truly blameworthy.”39 The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge 
was wrong to hold that any risk of harm is significant and erred in failing to 
identify the baseline risk before assessing an 80% reduction of that risk. The 
risk of transmission the trial judge should have considered was not 20%, but 
20% of “an already small baseline figure.”40 Thus, the risk of protected sex 
                                                   
36 2010 ONSC 1500 at para 6, [2010] OJ No 1795 (QL) (the accused was ultimately 
acquitted because the trial judge found neither the accused nor the complainant to 
be a credible witness). 
37 2008 MBQB 201, 230 ManR (2d) 184, 78 WCB (2d) 380 [Mabior (QB)]. 
38 Isabel Grant, “Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in HIV 
Nondisclosure Prosecutions” (2009) 54:2 McGill LJ 389 at 398 [Grant, “Rethink-
ing Risk”]. 
39 Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 55. 
40 Ibid at para 88. 
18 MCGILL JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH 
REVUE DE DROIT ET SANTÉ DE MCGILL 
Vol. 5 
No. 1 
 
 
was between 1 in 2,000 and 1 in 10,000.41 The Manitoba Court of Appeal 
found that “consistent and careful use of condoms”42 or “reasonably proper 
condom use”43 reduces the risk below significance. The Court of Appeal set 
out 10 criteria for assessing the “careful use of condoms,” recognizing that all 
10 criteria constitute an “ideal” and are unlikely to be met in any given case.44 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal clarified that if a condom breaks during sex-
ual activity, the accused must disclose his or her status immediately so that the 
HIV-negative partner can take prophylactic measures to decrease the likeli-
hood of becoming HIV-positive.45 Applying this test to the facts, the Court of 
Appeal considered the nature of the condom use with each complainant (find-
ing “a fair amount of recklessness” on the part of the accused)46 to determine 
its impact on the significance of the risk for each charge. In developing this 
“careful use of condoms test,” the Court of Appeal attempted to give substance 
to Justice Cory’s obiter comment that condom use might reduce the risk of 
harm below significance. The Manitoba Court of Appeal began the process of 
determining the standard that must be met for condom use to reduce the risk 
below the significant level. The Court of Appeal recognized, however, that it 
will be difficult for the Crown to prove that condom use on a particular occa-
sion was not careful enough: 
It is the Crown’s obligation to prove its case beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. To achieve the goal of careful and consistent condom 
use, as described by Dr. Smith, involves a complex series of 
steps. The inquiry as to whether there was careful and consistent 
use of a condom in a particular instance of sexual activity is like-
ly to be an unrealistic endeavour given that the sexual acts at is-
sue will often have occurred some time ago, in conjunction with 
the use of drugs and/or alcohol, and the participants may be 
young and unaware of how to properly use a condom. As an ex-
ample, where disclosure of the accused HIV-positive status oc-
curs sometime after the sex act, the actual condom is unlikely to 
                                                   
41 Ibid at para 89. 
42 Ibid at para 87. 
43 Ibid at para 92.  
44 Ibid at para 91. 
45 It should be noted that this did not prevent criminal liability in a 2009 Ontario case. 
The accused disclosed her status immediately after the condom ripped on the se-
cond occasion of protected intercourse. She pled guilty to two counts of sexual as-
sault. See “Toronto Woman gets House Arrest for Failing to Disclose HIV Status 
to Man” Canadian Press (20 November 2009). 
46 Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 96. 
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be available for examination and testing, so how is the Crown to 
prove that it did not meet the standards prescribed by Dr. Smith, 
particularly where it was the accused who provided and applied 
the condom?47  
No court in Canada has yet been faced with a case in which a condom was 
used but the virus was nonetheless transmitted. In such a rare case, it would be 
necessary for the trier of fact to examine the nature of condom use on the facts 
to determine if it was reasonably careful. In cases in which a condom was used 
and no transmission took place, it is likely that courts will assume that condom 
use was reasonable, in the absence of evidence suggesting otherwise. 
 Other jurisdictions have taken a clearer position on condom use. In Cali-
fornia, for example, the HIV-specific offence explicitly only criminalizes un-
protected sex.48 In the New Zealand case Police v Dalley, the accused was 
charged with criminal nuisance for having protected sex without disclosure. 49 
The District Court of Wellington held that the use of a condom constituted 
“reasonable precautions and care” and thus the accused was acquitted.50 The 
reasoning in that case reflects the New Zealand public health strategy focus on 
condom use rather than disclosure. 
 I have argued elsewhere that non-disclosure prosecutions should not be 
pursued in the context of protected sex,51 in part because of the importance of 
the public health message that encourages condom use for everyone, and not 
just by the HIV-positive person. Focusing on condom use is a more effective 
public health response than relying on disclosure, as disclosure itself offers no 
protection. The assumption behind disclosure is that if the accused discloses 
his or her status, the parties will not engage in unprotected sex.52 In this scenar-
io, disclosure is a proxy for safer sex or abstinence. However, a large number 
                                                   
47 Ibid at para 151. 
48 California Health and Safety Code § 120291. 
49 Police v Dalley, [2005] NZAR 682 (DC) [Dalley]. 
50 Ibid at para 39. 
51 Grant, “Rethinking Risk”, supra note 38 at 400; Grant, “The Boundaries of the 
Criminal Law”, supra note 6.  
52 Catherine Dodds et al, “A Telling Dilemma: HIV Disclosure Between Male 
(Homo)sexual Partners” (London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, 2004) online: Sigma Research <www.sigmaresearch.org.uk/ 
files/report2004e.pdf> (the authors conclude that it is not clear how disclosure 
impacts on subsequent sexual behaviour when dealing with men having sex with 
men). 
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of transmissions take place before the HIV-positive partner knows that he or 
she is infected, and one’s level of infectivity is high during the initial period af-
ter infection.53 Thus, reliance on disclosure is not an effective means of curb-
ing transmission. Such reliance assumes that the HIV-positive partner has ac-
curate information about his or her HIV status, which is often not the case.54 
Placing a burden on everyone, and not just the HIV-positive person, to reduce 
the risk of transmission (through, for example, insisting on condom use), will 
more effectively decrease the risk of transmission of HIV.55 The legal system 
should encourage this public health message rather than undermine it. 
B. Viral Load 
 Since the trial decision in Mabior, the courts have increasingly considered 
viral load in assessing the degree of risk presented by an accused. I have ar-
gued elsewhere that viral load should not be taken into account until our un-
derstanding of how it affects rates of transmission has developed.56 However, 
it is clear that courts must now confront this issue, both because the degree of 
risk is being assessed on a per-case basis, and because we are seeing an in-
creasing number of cases where the accused’s viral load was undetectable. Our 
understanding of viral load has evolved; if courts do not consider viral load, 
they will develop a distorted perception of the risk posed by HIV-positive in-
dividuals. Nevertheless, a focus on viral load is not unproblematic because of 
                                                   
53 Bluma G Brenner et al, “High Rates of Forward Transmission Events After 
Acute/Early HIV-1 Infection” (2007) 195:7 Journal of Infectious Diseases 951; 
Gary Marks, Nicole Crepaz & Robert S Janssen, “Estimating Sexual Transmission 
of HIV from Persons Aware and Unaware That They are Infected with the Virus 
in the USA” (2006) 20:10 AIDS 1447.  
54 See Donald C Ainslie, “AIDS and Sex: Is Warning a Moral Obligation?” (2002) 
10:1 Health Care Analysis 49. In Canada it is estimated that 26% of people living 
with HIV do not know their status; this number is estimated as high as 35% for 
heterosexual persons with HIV (Public Health Agency of Canada, “Summary: 
Estimates of HIV Prevalence and Incidence in Canada, 2008” (Ottawa: PHAC, 
2009) online: PHAC <www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/aids-sida/publication/survreport/ 
estimat08-eng.php>).  
55 I recognize, of course, that not everyone is in a position to insist on condom use. For 
example, women in abusive relationships, sex trade workers, or people in relation-
ships of unequal power may well be unable to safely insist on condom use.  
56 Grant, “Rethinking Risk” supra note 38. 
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disparate access to the necessary medical evidence.57 Not every HIV-positive 
person has access to ongoing medical care or the ability to keep regular ap-
pointments. It is also important to note that not every HIV-positive person has 
access to, or is able to tolerate, antiretroviral treatment.   
 Effective combination antiretroviral treatment, available since the mid-
1990s, has improved to such a degree that it is now possible to reduce the level 
of the virus in a person’s blood to undetectable levels. This does not mean that 
the virus is not present, but rather that the levels are so low that current tests 
cannot detect it in the blood.58 Our understanding of what this means for HIV 
transmission has also evolved since HAART first became available. As out-
lined above, scientists now believe that a low or undetectable viral load makes 
transmission of HIV from an infected person to his or her sexual partner ex-
tremely unlikely. We also now know that HIV is most transmissible when the 
viral load is high. Some studies have found that as many as half of new HIV 
transmissions take place in the acute stage of the infection when the viral load 
is as high as 1.26 million copies per millilitre of blood,59 before the individual 
knows that he or she is HIV-positive.60 HAART medications have also been 
found to increase life expectancy of those infected with HIV. One study esti-
mated that a person can expect to live into their early 60s after diagnosis at the 
age of 20 if they begin taking combination therapy immediately.61 Other re-
search has rated HAART’s effects higher still; under some conditions life ex-
pectancy was found to be almost normal.62 Expert evidence in Mabior stated 
                                                   
57 See e.g. Wright, supra note 4 at para 33, in which there was no evidence regarding 
the accused’s viral load at the time of the sexual activity. The court in Wright es-
sentially put the burden on the accused to establish a low viral load.  
58 The virus may still be detectable in other bodily fluids, such as semen. 
59 Maria J Wawer et al, “Rates of HIV-1 Transmission per Coital Act, by Stage of 
HIV-1 Infection, in Rakai, Uganda” (2005) 191:9 Journal of Infectious Diseases 
1403 at 1408. 
60 Marks, Crepaz & Janssen, supra note 53; Brenner et al, supra note 53 (Marks and 
his colleagues found that, adjusting for population size differences in the groups, 
the rate of transmission of HIV was 3.5 times higher in the group that was una-
ware of their HIV status then in the group that knew they had HIV). 
61 Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration, “Life Expectancy of Individuals on 
Combination Antiretroviral Therapy in High-Income Countries: A Collaborative 
Analysis of 14 Cohort Studies” (2008) 372:9635 The Lancet 293 at 297.  
62 Charlotte Lewden et al, “HIV-Infected Adults With a CD4 Cell Count Greater Than 
500 Cells/mm3 on Long-Term Combination Antiretroviral Therapy Reach Same 
Mortality Rates as the General Population” (2007) 46:1 Journal of Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome 72.  
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that “many if not most persons infected with HIV who receive and are compli-
ant with optimal care will die of a non-AIDS cause.”63 These numbers are just 
estimates, however, as the medications have not been available long enough to 
evaluate their long-term impact with certainty.  
 The first case to deal with viral load was R v McKenzie.64 The judge dis-
missed viral load as a “fragile defense,” pointing out that “[a]ll it reveals is the 
state of the blood tested on the day in question, not two weeks earlier, not two 
weeks later … To rely on slips of paper from a lab seems fraught with haz-
ard.”65 The trial judge in Mabior expressed the same concern and required 
condom use combined with an undetectable viral load to reduce the risk below 
significant levels.66  
 In Wright, the accused appealed his conviction on two counts of aggravat-
ed sexual assault.67 One of his arguments was that there was no evidence that 
he had a significant viral load at the time of the offence, and thus that there 
was insufficient evidence that he presented a significant risk of serious harm. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the 
jury was entitled to rely on the average rate of risk presented by the expert tes-
timony, despite some evidence that the accused was taking antiretroviral medi-
cations at the time. The Court of Appeal did acknowledge the relevance of vi-
ral load, stating “this does not mean viral loads are irrelevant to the determina-
tion of criminal liability. If the viral load of the accused at the time of the sexu-
al relations is known or can be estimated, then it will be very relevant to de-
termining whether there was a significant risk of serious bodily harm.”68 
 The Court of Appeal further held that it was up to the accused to introduce 
evidence about his own viral load. Denying that it was imposing a burden of 
proof on the accused, the Court stated that it is “a tactical decision for the ac-
cused to make on the basis of his assessment of the Crown’s case.”69 Thus, the 
Crown need not lead evidence of viral load in each case to prove that the risk 
                                                   
63 Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 63. 
64 R v McKenzie, (9 March 2006), Windsor (Ont Sup Ct Just), Donohue J cited in Isa-
bel Grant, “Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in HIV 
Nondisclosure Prosecutions”, Case Comment, (2009) 54:2 McGill LJ 389 at 402.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Mabior (QB), supra note 37. 
67 Wright, supra note 4. 
68 Ibid at para 32. 
69 Ibid at para 33. Note that the Manitoba Court of Appeal expressly agrees with this 
passage: Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 105. 
2011 
 
THE PROSECUTION OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF HIV IN CANADA: 
TIME TO RETHINK CUERRIER 
23 
 
 
is significant, but an accused may meet expert evidence about risks of trans-
mission with specific information about his or her own viral load, which will 
make the risk assessment more precise and individualized to the accused. The 
result is that an undetectable viral load will constitute a defence if established 
by the accused, but the starting point, in the absence of evidence, is that the ac-
cused has a detectable viral load. There is no discussion in Wright of the stand-
ard of proof that must be met by the accused in this regard, or whether it is just 
a practical evidentiary burden. The judgment is probably a reaction to the 
heavy burden the Crown would face if required to prove a detectable viral load 
at the time of the alleged non-disclosure, thus rendering prosecution difficult 
where no evidence on viral load is available. Yet, if the risk of transmission in 
many cases is minimal, given the increasing number of HIV-positive individu-
als on HAART,70 perhaps we need to re-think our assessments of risk. This al-
so raises questions about what the starting point should be where there is no 
evidence of viral load: should we assume that an individual had a detectable 
viral load? Is evidence of the use of antiretroviral medication sufficient to ne-
gate this assumption? 
 The Manitoba Court of Appeal’s decision in Mabior echoed the trial 
judge’s concern that viral load reflects “a moment in time,” and highlighted the 
fragility of evidence of viral load:  
If a person were to miss a dose of this medication, at some point, 
after 72 hours, an individual could become resistant to the medi-
cation, although it is uncertain how long this might take since it 
depends on an individual’s metabolism. So, it is difficult to 
know one’s viral load at a particular point in time and to ensure 
it remains undetectable. Common infections, STDs and treat-
ment issues can lead to fluctuations in a person’s viral load. 
HIV-positive people with apparently undetectable viral loads 
can experience occasional spikes in viral load or may develop 
viral resistance.71 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that, given its impact on 
transmission rates, viral load cannot be ignored.72 The Court of Appeal went 
on to look at the evidence regarding the accused’s viral load for each of the 
counts on the indictment to determine whether the risk was significant enough 
                                                   
70 See e.g. Julio SG Montaner, “Association of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy 
Coverage, Population Viral Load, and Yearly New HIV Diagnoses in British Co-
lumbia, Canada: A Population-based Study” (2010) 376:9740 The Lancet 532. 
71 Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 112. 
72 Ibid at para 102. 
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to warrant criminal liability. The Court of Appeal accepted expert evidence 
that a spike in viral load between tests was unlikely given the accused’s appar-
ent compliance with antiretroviral therapy. 
 In DC, two medical witnesses testified at trial that the risk of a male con-
tracting HIV from his HIV-positive female partner during vaginal intercourse 
is about 1 in 1,000, and, if the female’s viral load is undetectable (as it was in 
this case), 1 in 10,000.73 The judge nonetheless convicted the accused of ag-
gravated assault and sexual assault because he found that the risk was suffi-
cient for endangerment of life, even though the activity in this case was statis-
tically very low-risk: on average, the virus would be transmitted only once in 
every 10,000 acts of intercourse. The trial judge did not apply the significant 
risk of serious bodily harm test to the consent analysis as required by Cuerrier. 
The Québec Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding that the unde-
tectable viral load and low risk of transmission did not reach the threshold of 
significant risk of serious harm and, thus, that non-disclosure did not vitiate 
consent: 
À la réflexion, j'estime qu'en l'espèce, le risque de transmission 
du VIH était si faible qu'il ne constituait pas « un risque impor-
tant de préjudice grave » pour le plaignant et qu'en conséquence, 
le fait pour l'appelante de ne pas avoir informé ce dernier de son 
état de santé ne peut pas avoir vicié son consentement à une re-
lation sexuelle non protégée.74 
 The Cuerrier test forces courts and juries to weigh in on the developing 
science of viral load and its impact on transmission rates. It also presents a di-
lemma: accused persons who have access to antiretroviral medication and viral 
load test results will be more likely to get an acquittal than those who do not.75 
This also raises difficult questions about culpability. Is the degree of risk strict-
ly a matter of whether the actus reus has been established, or is the accused’s 
knowledge of his or her viral load and the impact that viral load has on the risk 
of transmission also relevant? If an accused with an undetectable viral load had 
no idea that it was relevant to transmission, he or she could nonetheless be ac-
quitted because the actus reus–a significant risk of serious bodily harm–would 
                                                   
73 DC (CQ), supra note 28 at para 179 (where the female’s viral load is undetectable, 
and a condom is used, the risk was reported to be 1 in 50,000). 
74 DC (CA) supra note 4 at para 100. 
75 In Wright, supra note 4 at para 33, for example, in the absence of clear evidence as 
to viral load the accused’s viral load was presumed to be detectable, despite some 
evidence that the accused was taking antiretroviral medication. The accused had 
developed serious side effects consistent with that medication. 
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not be present. A more difficult case arises if the accused wrongly believed 
that his or her viral load rendered them non-infectious. The non-disclosure 
cases to date have said very little about the fault component of these very seri-
ous crimes and how fault relates to the significant risk of serious harm re-
quirement.76 The only explicit fault requirement discussed in these cases has 
been knowledge of one’s HIV-positive status, and in Williams, the Supreme 
Court suggested that being “aware of the risk” that one is HIV-positive is suf-
ficient to establish recklessness.77 Little attention has been paid to whether the 
bodily harm was reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances.78 It is certainly 
arguable that such harm is not foreseeable where a condom is used carefully, 
where the accused has an undetectable viral load, and, especially, where both 
are true.  
C. Nature of Sexual Activity 
 We are now aware that different sexual activities, all other factors being 
equal, have very different risk levels. Oral sex, for example, is considered low 
risk. In Edwards, the Crown acknowledged that charges would not have been 
laid for oral sex alone.79 Nevertheless, in R v Aziga, the accused was convicted 
on one count of aggravated sexual assault on the basis of unprotected oral sex 
alone where the virus was allegedly transmitted.80 
 Unprotected anal intercourse is commonly acknowledged to be a high risk 
activity. However, the risk for an HIV-negative receptive partner is significant-
                                                   
76 The trial judge in Mabior considered the accused’s mental state with respect to his 
viral load: “even if the accused had been told that his viral load was under control, 
that does not translate to knowledge that his ability to transmit the disease was 
low. …The accused did not know that he could not transmit during this 
timeframe” (supra note 37 at para 133). It is unclear from the judgment what im-
pact this had on the judge’s finding that consent had been vitiated, and it was not 
discussed by the Court of Appeal. 
77 In R v Willams, 2003 SCC 4 at para 28, [2003] 2 SCR 134 [Williams] the Court did 
not address foreseeability of harm: “Once an individual becomes aware of the risk 
that he or she has contracted HIV, and hence that his or her partner's consent has 
become an issue, but nevertheless persists in unprotected sex that creates a risk of 
further HIV transmission without disclosure to his or her partner, recklessness is 
established.” 
78 R v Godin, [1994] 2 SCR 484 imposes an objective standard of fault for the conse-
quences.  
79 Edwards, supra note 26. 
80 R v Aziga, (1 April 2009) CR081735 at 71-74 (Charge to jury). 
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ly greater than the risk for an HIV-negative insertive partner. In R v JT,81 the 
accused failed to disclose his HIV-positive status to his male partner. The two 
engaged in anal intercourse and the HIV-positive accused was always the re-
ceptive partner. Evidence at the preliminary inquiry indicated that the risk of 
transmission in this particular case was approximately 1.5 in 10,000 for each 
act of unprotected intercourse. The accused was ordered to stand trial and 
sought to quash the committal on the basis that the Crown failed to provide 
any evidence of a significant risk of serious harm because the risk of transmis-
sion to an insertive partner is so low. The Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network 
intervened and argued that non-disclosure should not be criminalized where 
the infected individual uses a condom or where the risk is equally low for 
some other reason, such as low viral load or the role of each partner in the sex-
ual activity: 
The Interveners ask that this Honourable Court clarify that, as a 
matter of Canadian law, non-disclosure of HIV-positive status to 
a sexual partner does not constitute a criminal offence where the 
risk is reduced through the use of a condom for penetrative anal 
or vaginal sex or in analogous circumstances where the risk is 
comparably low or lower than that benchmark.82 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Cuerrier set 
a benchmark and held that risk must be assessed in individual cases. The Court 
of Appeal noted that anal intercourse without a condom is a high risk activity 
without assessing whether the infected individual is the receptive or insertive 
partner, a fact which has been found to alter the risk considerably.83  
 When this case went back to trial on its merits, the trial judge found that 
the risk was between 1.5 in 10,000 (according to the expert at the preliminary 
inquiry) and 4 in 10,000 (according to the expert at trial) for each act of unpro-
tected intercourse. The risk is cumulative, such that if there were (as found by 
the trial judge) three acts of unprotected sex, the risk would be between 4.5 
and 12 in 10,000. The expert evidence also suggested that the risk of an HIV-
positive receptive partner passing on the virus to the non-infected insertive 
partner was approximately the same as the risk of protected sex where the in-
sertive partner is HIV-positive. The respective roles of the parties involved in 
sexual activity were thus as significant as whether a condom was used. The tri-
al judge held that this risk was not significant enough to meet the Cuerrier test 
and acquitted the accused. 
                                                   
81 JT, supra note 29. 
82 Ibid at para 16. 
83 See e.g. Baggaley, White & Boily, supra note 10. 
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 Clearly, if courts are looking at viral load and condom use as relevant to 
risk, the type of sexual activity involved must be part of the equation, as it has 
a similarly significant impact on the level of risk. 
D. The Numbers Game  
 The movement away from using protected intercourse as the clear dividing 
line between criminal and non-criminal conduct–and the emergence of factors 
such as viral load–has led to a more individualized (some might say ad hoc) 
approach to risk analysis. By and large, courts have increasingly relied on ex-
pert evidence to provide them with numerical assessments of the risk of trans-
mission associated with specific conduct. This carries with it all the problems 
associated with reliance on expert witnesses. Depending on the availability of 
experts to the Crown and the defence, courts hear different evidence and re-
ceive different evaluations of risk. Some experts are unwilling to estimate the 
specific risk of the conduct of a particular accused, while others are willing to 
provide an individualized probability of transmission. At the retrial of R v 
Nduwayo, the expert witness declined to provide a numerical assessment of 
risk, instead asking the court, “[i]s that a risk you would like to take?”84 The 
figures provided to the courts for the average risk vary as research and scien-
tific knowledge of transmission develops. Finally, once provided with a nu-
merical estimate of risk, courts have come to different decisions as to what 
figure is “significant.”  
 It is left to triers of fact to digest sometimes conflicting expert evidence 
and then assess whether a particular risk of bodily harm is significant. It is not 
unusual for triers of fact to have to evaluate risks like 4 in 10,000,85 or 1 in 
200.86 Do these numbers really inform our assessment of whether someone 
should be convicted of one of our most serious crimes? Should it matter 
whether the risk materialized? 
 In R v Jones,87 where the accused was charged after failing to disclose that 
he had hepatitis C, a risk of transmission of 1 in 100 to 2.5 in 100 was found to 
be below the level required to constitute a significant risk: 
                                                   
84 R v Nduwayo, 2010 BCSC 1277 at para 136, [2011] BCWLD 1457, [2010] BCJ No 
1787 (QL). 
85 JT, supra note 29. 
86 Wright, supra note 4 at para 24. 
87 Jones, supra note 8. 
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For Hepatitis ‘C’ in monogamous heterosexual couples, the risk 
of transmission is less than 1%. The risk increases for those en-
gaging in anal sex to between 1-2.5% ... I find that in the case of 
Hepatitis ‘C’ the risk of contracting it through unprotected sex is 
so low that it cannot be described as significant. Therefore, the 
positive duty to disclose does not arise.88 
This conclusion was probably influenced by the description of the risk as “very 
low” by experts.89 In addition, because the disease is blood-borne and only 
sexually transmitted if there is blood-to-blood contact, the risk likely appeared 
more remote to the judge than the percentage figure indicates. In Jones, the 
expert compared Hepatitis C with HIV and said that, by contrast, the risk of 
transmitting HIV is high.90 In fact, the risk of 1-2.5 in 100 deemed insignifi-
cant in Jones is on par with–or higher than–the risk identified as significant in 
any of the HIV transmission cases for similar sexual activities. 
 In DC, the trial judge convicted the accused of aggravated assault and sex-
ual assault notwithstanding a risk of 1 in 10,000. The trial court essentially 
found that any risk of transmission, however remote, is sufficient because the 
potential harm is seen as so great. The Québec Court of Appeal recently over-
turned this finding and acquitted the accused because the risk of transmission 
was so low as to be insignificant.91 The facts of DC highlight the potential for 
problematic exercise of prosecutorial discretion, particularly in charging deci-
sions. After the accused disclosed her HIV positive status to the complainant, 
the couple continued their relationship for four years, engaging in protected 
sex. It was not until after the relationship ended, and the complainant was con-
victed of assaulting the accused in separate proceedings, that he went to police 
about the one alleged incident of unprotected sex that had taken place four 
years earlier. The accused was charged with aggravated assault and sexual as-
sault even though the virus was undetectable and the risk of transmission was 
approximately 1 in 10,000.92 This case demonstrates why prosecutorial guide-
lines are essential in this context. What is to be gained in prosecuting this 
woman for one isolated incident of non-disclosure, followed by disclosure and 
ongoing protected sex, especially where the risk of transmission was so low?  
                                                   
88 Ibid at paras 26, 33. 
89 Ibid at para 23. 
90 Ibid at para 25. 
91 DC (CA), supra note 4.  
92 Ibid. 
2011 
 
THE PROSECUTION OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF HIV IN CANADA: 
TIME TO RETHINK CUERRIER 
29 
 
 
DC also raises the problem of disclosure for women in potentially abusive re-
lationships.93 
 In Mabior, as discussed above, the trial judge found that even with the use 
of a condom, someone with a detectable viral load represented a significant 
risk to his sexual partner. She relied on expert evidence that condoms reduce 
the risk of transmission by 80%, but without examining the ramifications of 
that figure for the numerical assessment of risk.94 The Manitoba Court of Ap-
peal corrected this error, acknowledging that the trial judge’s finding that any 
risk of transmission is too high was inconsistent with the Cuerrier test. The 
Court of Appeal also acknowledged the discrepancies between the numbers 
that different courts have assessed as significant; nevertheless, “it was not seri-
ously disputed … that unprotected sexual intercourse with an individual with 
an unrepressed viral load constitutes a significant risk of serious bodily harm 
even though, from an absolute statistical point of view, the risk is small.”95 
 Wright highlights the different ways in which experts assess risk and the 
resulting problems when courts rely on such numerical analyses. In Wright, the 
expert witness did not identify particular factors most relevant in assessing the 
risk of transmission, focusing instead on the wide range of circumstances in-
cluded in the average calculations of risk.96 He refused to estimate the specific 
risk for the conduct undertaken by the accused and relied on averages, stating 
that “the risk of HIV infection by a woman from vaginal intercourse with a 
male who is HIV-positive is between 0.1% and 1.0%; so the experts generally 
say the risk of transmission is 0.5%.”97 While stressing the unreliability of re-
                                                   
93 See Patricia Allard, Cecile Kazachkine & Alison Symington, “Criminal Prosecu-
tions for HIV Nondisclosure: Protecting Women from Infection or Threatening 
Prevention Efforts?” in Jacqueline Gahagan, ed, Women and HIV Prevention in 
Canada: The Past, The Present and the Future: Implications for Research, Policy 
and Practice (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, forthcoming in 2012) [Copy on 
file with author]; Alison Symington, “HIV Exposure as Assault: Progressive De-
velopment or Misplaced Focus?” in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault Law, 
Practice & Activism in a Post-Jane Doe Era (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 
forthcoming in 2011) online: University of Ottawa 
<www.ruor.uottawa.ca/en/handle/10393/19876>. 
94 Mabior (QB), supra note 37 at para 116. See also Grant, “Rethinking Risk,” supra 
note 38. 
95 Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 154. 
96 Wright, supra note 4 at paras 26-27. 
97 Ibid at para 8. 
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porting on condom use, he testified that condoms reduce the transmission risk 
to 1 in 10,000.98  
  Although the expert in Wright acknowledged that a low viral load can re-
duce the risk of transmission between 100 and 1,000 times, he stated that viral 
load is only one of many factors that feed into the average risk of 1 in 200.99 
This contrasts significantly with experts in other cases who are willing to as-
sess the particular risk more precisely, and to identify the specific factors they 
consider most influential in altering risk.100 The jury in Wright found that the 
average risk of 0.5% was significant enough to warrant criminal liability.  
 In contrast with Wright, the expert at the preliminary hearing in JT identi-
fied three central factors in the rate of HIV transmission: the type of sex act, 
viral load, and co-infection with other illnesses.101 As stated above, the expert 
at trial estimated the risk to the complainant at 4 in 10,000 per act of unpro-
tected intercourse, for a cumulative risk of 12 in 10,000 for three acts of unpro-
tected sex over the course of their relationship.102 The trial judge found that a 
risk of 12 in 10,000 was not significant enough to negate consent.103 
 The cases reveal, at best, the lack of precision in assessing risk and, at 
worst, blatant inconsistency regarding the acceptable level of risk. The trial de-
cision in JAT and the appellate decisions in Mabior and DC reflect a growing 
awareness that not every risk of transmission warrants criminal liability; some 
risks are too remote to meet the Cuerrier test. Nonetheless, there is still the po-
tential in Canada for cases that extend criminalization beyond its appropriate 
reach. The statistical estimates offered by experts concerning condoms, viral 
load, circumcision, and various sexual practices will continue to confound 
judges and juries, and may never offer the level of precision necessary to dis-
charge  the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden in criminal law.  
                                                   
98 Ibid at para 11. 
99 Ibid at para 27. 
100 See e.g. JT, supra note 29. 
101 Ibid at para 9. 
102 Ibid at paras 29-31. 
103 Empirical data reveals men involved in heterosexual sex have a higher rate of 
prosecution: Eric Mykhalovskiy, Glenn Betteridge & David McLay, HIV Non-
disclosure and the Criminal Law: Establishing Policy Options for Ontario (Toron-
to: Ontario HIV Treatment Network, 2010) at 12 online: CATIE 
<www.catie.ca/pdf/Brochures/HIV-non-disclosure-criminal-law.pdf >. 
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III. What Can We Learn from Other Jurisdictions? 
 Not all jurisdictions have taken the approach that non-disclosure consti-
tutes fraud negating consent to sexual activity. In fact, in England and Wales, 
New Zealand, and Australia, transmission or exposure in the context of non-
disclosure is not dealt with as a sexual offence, but rather as an offence involv-
ing bodily harm.104 The purpose of the following brief review is to demonstrate 
alternatives to the regime in Canada by highlighting aspects of the law in each 
jurisdiction. 
A. England and Wales  
 There are an estimated 86,500 people living with HIV in the United King-
dom.105 As of October 2010, there have been approximately 17 prosecutions in 
England and Wales. Fifteen accused were men and two were women. Thirteen 
of 17 accused were convicted, 11 of those convictions resulted from guilty 
pleas. Three of the prosecutions involved men having sex with men; the other 
14 involved heterosexual transmission.106  
 In England and Wales, the criminal law punishes intentional and reckless 
transmission of HIV. Non-disclosure of one’s HIV-positive status does not vi-
tiate consent to sex, and individuals convicted for intentional or reckless 
transmission are rarely treated as sex offenders.107 Transmission is prosecuted 
                                                   
104 Switching to offences focusing on bodily harm still leaves open the potential for 
overcharging with offences such as murder and attempted murder. See e.g. Adam 
McDowell, “Public safety trumps privacy in Ottawa HIV case” The National Post 
(27 July 2010) [Copy archived with MJLH] (charges against an Ottawa man in-
clude two counts of attempted murder along with several counts of aggravated 
sexual assault; attempted murder is a difficult charge to prove because an intent to 
kill–and not mere recklessness–must be established). 
105 Health Protection Agency, HIV in the United Kingdom: 2010 Report (2010) 4:47 
Health Protection Reports 1, online: <www.hpa.org.uk/hivuk2010> [UK HPA Re-
port] (A quarter of these are undiagnosed). 
106 National AIDS Trust, “Criminal Prosecution Case Table” (October 2010), online: 
<www.nat.org.uk> [NAT, “Case Table”]. 
107 In England and Wales, it remains open on sentencing to issue offenders with a 
Sexual Offence Prevention Order, as was done in two cases, pursuant to the Sexu-
al Offences Act 2003 (UK), 2003 c 42, s 104. See NAT, “Case Table”, ibid; R v 
Hornett, [2009] EWCA Crim 1742. 
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under one of two provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861.108 
Section 18 of the Act criminalizes intentional infliction of harm: 
18. Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means 
whatsoever wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any 
person ... with intent ... to do some ... grievous bodily harm to 
any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful appre-
hension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of felony, and 
being convicted thereof shall be liable ... to be kept in penal ser-
vitude for life ... 
 Because of the difficulty of proving that someone actually intended to 
transmit HIV through sex (as opposed to intending to have unprotected sex), 
no charges under section 18 have proceeded to trial.109 A person could theoret-
ically be charged with attempted intentional transmission where no transmis-
sion occurs, but there are currently no such cases; again this is probably due to 
the high fault requirement. The cases thus far have all proceeded under section 
20, which criminalizes the reckless infliction of bodily injury: 
20. Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or in-
flict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either 
with or without any weapon or Instrument, shall be guilty of a 
Misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable … 
to be kept in penal servitude … 
The maximum sentence for this offence is five years imprisonment.110 The 
most important fact to note is that only cases that involve actual transmission 
are prosecuted under this provision. 
 In 2008, the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales published 
policy guidelines for prosecuting sexual transmission of an infection.111 These 
guidelines are not legally binding but rather provide direction to prosecutors 
                                                   
108 Offences Against the Person Act, 1931 (UK), 24 & 25 Geo V, c 100 ss 18, 20. 
109 Catherine Dodds et al, “Responses to Criminal Prosecutions for HIV Transmission 
Among Gay Men with HIV in England and Wales” (2009) 17:34 Reproductive 
Health Matters 135 at 137. See also NAT, “Case Table”, supra note 106. 
110 Penal Servitude Act, 1891 (UK), 54 & 55 Geo V, c 69, s 1(1); Criminal Justice 
Act, 1948 (UK), 11 & 12 Geo V, c 58, s 1(1). The general sentence for many 
crimes was set out in the Penal Servitude Act; these sentences were modified by 
the Criminal Justice Act, which replaced penal servitude (hard labour) with mere 
imprisonment. 
111 The Crown Prosecution Service, “Policy for Prosecuting Cases Involving the In-
tentional or Reckless Sexual Transmission of Infection”, online: CPS 
<www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/sti.html> [“England Crown Policy”]. 
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regarding which cases should be prosecuted. The guidelines demonstrate that 
England and Wales take a much more cautious approach to prosecuting these 
offences than does Canada. For example, the prosecutorial guidelines suggest 
that only a sustained course of conduct warrants a charge of reckless transmis-
sion: 
It will be highly unlikely that the prosecution will be able to 
demonstrate the required degree of recklessness in factual cir-
cumstances other than a sustained course of conduct during 
which the defendant ignores current scientific advice regarding 
the need for and the use of safeguards, thereby increasing the 
risk of infection to an unacceptable level.112 
 According to the guidelines, recklessness is not about non-disclosure (alt-
hough consent may be raised as a defence by asserting that disclosure was 
made), rather, it involves assessing the accused’s behaviour against the medi-
cal advice he or she received. The following passage suggests that the use of 
safeguards, such as a condom, might also negate recklessness. Condoms are 
not raised directly in the guidelines, but one can infer that prosecution should 
only be initiated for unprotected sex:  
Evidence that the defendant took appropriate safeguards to pre-
vent the transmission of the infection throughout the entire peri-
od of sexual activity, and evidence that those safeguards satisfy 
medical experts as reasonable in light of the nature of the infec-
tion, will mean that it will be highly unlikely that the prosecution 
will be able to demonstrate that the defendant was reckless.113  
The guidelines go on to suggest that if the accused believed that the safeguards 
were reasonable, recklessness will be hard to establish: 
Although infection can occur even where reasonable and appro-
priate safeguards have been taken, it is also of course possible 
that the infection took place because the safeguards and/or their 
use or application were inappropriate. However, prosecutors will 
need to take into account what the defendant considered to be 
the adequacy and appropriateness of the safeguards adopted; on-
ly where it can be shown that the defendant knew that such safe-
guards were inappropriate will it be likely that the prosecution 
will be able to prove recklessness.114 
                                                   
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
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These requirements, if followed, suggest that protected sex is extremely un-
likely to lead to prosecution in England and Wales.115 
 Because only cases of actual transmission are prosecuted, causation is a 
critical issue. The Crown must prove that the complainant acquired the virus 
from the accused. Prior to 2006, phylogenetics was often used to support cau-
sation. Phylogenetics is a scientific technique that determines whether the 
strain of the virus carried by the complainant is the same as, or similar to, the 
strain carried by the accused. This evidence has prompted some accused to en-
ter guilty pleas and has sometimes been misunderstood as providing proof of 
causation.116 Phylogenetics, however, shows the genetic similarity between vi-
ruses but provides no evidence of the direction of transmission (i.e. who 
transmitted the virus to whom). In a 2006 case, the accused was acquitted be-
cause phylogenetics was found to be inadequate to prove causation.117 Since 
this case, there have been no successful prosecutions where the accused has 
pled not guilty; there have been five guilty pleas and three acquittals.118  
 English prosecutorial guidelines reflect the inconclusive nature of phylo-
genetics: 
However, scientific and medical evidence will only ever form 
part of the case against the defendant. We must build up a 
strong factual case around the scientific and medical evidence 
in order to satisfy the evidential test in the Code. This is be-
cause scientific and medical evidence of this nature is not as 
precise as, for example, evidence of DNA matches.119 
 The two leading cases in England and Wales are R v Dica120 and R v Kon-
zani,121 both of which were decided before the prosecutorial guidelines were 
developed. Dica was convicted at his second trial of one of two counts of reck-
                                                   
115 It is possible that a prosecution could take place where a condom was used if the 
virus was still transmitted, but I have been unable to find any such cases. 
116 EJ Bernard et al, “HIV Forensics: Pitfalls and Acceptable Standards in the Use of 
Phylogenetic Analysis as Evidence in Criminal Investigations of HIV Transmis-
sion” (2007) 8:6 HIV Medicine 382 at 386. 
117 Michael Carter, “Prosecution for Reckless HIV Transmission in England Ends 
With Not Guilty Verdict” (9 August 2006) online: AIDSmap 
<www.aidsmap.com/page/1424549/>. 
118 NAT, “Case Table”, supra note 106. 
119 “England Crown Policy”, supra note 111. 
120 R v Dica, [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 at para 39, [2004] Crim LR 944 [Dica].  
121 R v Konzani, [2005] EWCA Crim 706, [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 [Konzani]. 
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lessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 20 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act, 1861. Both of the female complainants were HIV-
positive. Dica’s original conviction was overturned on appeal because the trial 
judge had erred in disallowing the defence of consent to the risk of potential 
harm flowing from sexual activity. Out of a desire to avoid criminalizing the 
consensual taking of risks, the English Court of Appeal found that consent 
could operate as a defence in the context of reckless transmission, if the com-
plainant consented to the risk of infection (even though non-consent was not, 
strictly speaking, an element of the offence). While disclosure is not the only 
way to show consent, it is the most likely way to raise the defence.122 The 
Court of Appeal also stated that if a condom had been used, it would have 
gone to the assessment of recklessness by the trier of fact. The Court of Appeal 
in Dica also suggested that liability applies to those who “know that they are 
suffering HIV or some other serious sexual disease,”123 suggesting it is not suf-
ficient to know that one could be HIV-positive.124 
 Konzani was convicted of three counts of recklessly inflicting grievous 
bodily harm on three female complainants, all of whom had contracted HIV. 
Konzani argued that by engaging in unprotected intercourse with him, the 
complainants impliedly consented to any possible attendant risks, including the 
risk of contracting HIV. The English Court of Appeal rejected this argument 
on the ground that consent must be informed.125 
 It is clear that criminalizing only actual transmission will greatly reduce 
the number of prosecutions. Further limits on prosecution established by the 
prosecutorial guidelines, such as the use of reasonable safeguards, have result-
ed in a relatively low level of prosecution in England and Wales as compared 
to Canada. As demonstrated in the following section, New Zealand has taken a 
slightly different approach. 
                                                   
122 As Weait points out there may be other ways that a person has knowledge of an 
accused's HIV status without disclosure. Furthermore, he would argue that there is 
always the risk of acquiring HIV in unprotected sex and that the complainant is 
equally responsible for failing to use a condom: Matthew Weait, “Criminal Law 
and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica” (2005) 68:1 Mod L Rev 121. See 
also Matthew Weait, “Taking the Blame: Criminal Law, Social responsibility and 
the Sexual Transmission of HIV” (2001) 23:4 J of Soc Welfare & Fam L 441. 
123 Dica, supra note 120 at para 59. 
124 Because Dica did in fact know his HIV-positive status, it wasn't strictly necessary 
for the Court to decide this point. 
125 Konzani, supra note 121 at para 42. 
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B. New Zealand  
 As of 2009, there were an estimated 2,500 people living with HIV in New 
Zealand.126 As of December 2008, there have been at least seven prosecutions 
for non-disclosure with six convictions; all the accused have been men.127 In 
New Zealand, there are three potential levels of liability, depending on fault 
and whether transmission occurred. Section 201 of the Crimes Act, 1961 crim-
inalizes the intentional transmission of a disease and is applicable where HIV 
is intentionally transmitted: 
(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
14 years who, wilfully and without lawful justification or ex-
cuse, causes or produces in any other person any disease or 
sickness.128 
There have not been any successful prosecutions for intentional sexual trans-
mission under this section because of the high fault requirement.129  
 Where the virus is recklessly transmitted, section 188 is the most likely 
charge:  
(2) Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
7 years who, with intent to injure anyone, or with reckless disre-
gard for the safety of others, wounds, maims, disfigures, or 
causes grievous bodily harm to any person. 
The courts have held that non-disclosure in the context of unprotected vaginal 
intercourse satisfies the recklessness criterion.130 The New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Mwai held that infection with HIV constitutes grievous bodily harm 
because of the seriousness of the resulting disease and its consequences, but 
limited the ambit of grievous bodily harm to infection with serious diseases.131 
                                                   
126 UNAIDS, “New Zealand”, online: UNAIDS 
    <www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/newzealand/> . 
127 Global Criminalisation Scan, “New Zealand”, online: GCS 
<www.gnpplus.net/criminalisation/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id
=244&Itemid=47>. 
128 (NZ), 1961/43 [Crimes Act (NZ)]. 
129 Amelia Evans, “Critique of the Criminalisation of Sexual HIV Transmission” 
(2007) 38:3 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 517. 
130 R v Mwai, [1995] 3 NZLR 149 (CA) [Mwai]. 
131 Ibid at 153. 
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  Where sex, without disclosure, does not result in transmission of the virus, 
the much less serious offence of criminal nuisance (section 145) is utilized, 
which carries a maximum sentence of one-year imprisonment:  
 (1) Every one commits criminal nuisance who does any un-
lawful act or omits to discharge any legal duty, such act or omis-
sion being one which he knew would endanger the lives, safety, 
or health of the public, or the life, safety, or health of any indi-
vidual.132 
The Court of Appeal in Mwai found that the legal duty in question is the com-
mon law duty not to expose others to foreseeable harm.133 There is also a statu-
tory duty set out in section 156. Although Mwai did not decide whether or not 
the statutory duty also applies, subsequent decisions have considered the legal 
duty in light of the language of section 156:134 
[E]very one who has in his charge or under his control anything 
whatever … which, in the absence of precaution or care, may 
endanger human life is under legal duty to take reasonable pre-
cautions against and to use reasonable care to avoid such danger 
…135 
If one takes “reasonable precautions” or uses “reasonable care” to avoid the 
harm, the accused will not be guilty of criminal nuisance. In Police v Dalley, 
the Court of Appeal held that use of a condom is a reasonable precaution.136 
On a charge relating to oral sex without a condom, the trial judge also held 
that, because the risk involved in oral sex without ejaculation is so low, the ac-
cused satisfied the reasonable care criterion even without taking any precau-
tions. Thus, criminal nuisance does not encompass every instance of non-
disclosure of one’s HIV-positive status; there must be a sufficient level of risk 
to warrant criminalization. 
                                                   
132 Crimes Act (NZ), supra note 128 s 145. 
133 Mwai, supra note 130 at 156. 
134 Dalley, supra note 49 at 683-84. 
135 Crimes Act (NZ), supra note 128. 
136 Dalley, supra note 49. 
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C.  Australia 
 There were an estimated 20,000 people living with HIV in Australia in 
2009.137 The Global Criminalisation Scan states that as of February 2010, 28 
prosecutions had been undertaken in Australia, and 15 people had been con-
victed.138 The NAPWA Monograph estimates slightly lower numbers, with 22 
prosecutions undertaken, 12 convictions, and 3 additional instances where 
charges were dropped as of September 2009.139 There has been a notable in-
crease in prosecutions since 2007, particularly in the states of South Australia 
and Victoria. As in New Zealand, all accused have been male.140 
 The criminal law in Australia is under the jurisdiction of each state or terri-
tory. The law of all nine jurisdictions, with the exception of Victoria, provides 
that consent is not valid if given as a result of misrepresentation or fraud as to 
the nature of the sexual intercourse. Nevertheless, Australia has not labeled 
non-disclosure as fraud that vitiates consent to the sexual act, a position that 
avoids imposing the label “sex offender” on a person convicted of non-
disclosure.141 
                                                   
137 UNAIDS, “Australia”, online: UNAIDS <www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/ 
countries/australia/>.  
138 The Global Criminalisation Scan, “Australia”, online: GCS 
<www.gnpplus.net/criminalisation/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i
d=254&Itemid=70>. 
139 The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission in Australia: Legality, Morality and Re-
ality (2009), online: National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS 
<www.napwa.org.au> [NAPWA Monograph] 
140 Australasian Society for HIV Medicine, “Guide to Australian HIV Laws and Poli-
cies for Health Care Professionals: Criminal Law”, online: ASHM 
<www.ashm.org.au/HIVLegal/Default.asp?PublicationID=2&ParentSectionID=P
2&SectionID=342> [ASHM, “Guide to Australian HIV Laws and Policies”]. 
141 The offence of fraud has been discussed in Australia: R v Reid, [2006] QCA 202, 1 
Qd R 64, 162 A Crim R 377 [Reid]. McPherson JA, in dissent, suggested that to 
meet the statutory requirement that the act be ‘unlawful’, the offence of fraud un-
der s 408C(1)(e), Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) could be applied. He echoed Cuerrier 
when he said, at para 20: “[i]nducing someone to have unprotected intercourse 
with him by falsely representing that he was not HIV positive, while knowing that 
he was, seems to me to fall within the ambit of this provision. It hardly need be 
said that infecting someone with HIV involves causing a detriment to him or her.” 
This suggestion was not taken up by the High Court of Australia, which refused 
leave to appeal on the grounds that certain exceptional “features of the evidence at 
trial that make this an unpromising case for this Court’s intervention” (R v Reid, 
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 Only three of the nine Australian jurisdictions criminalize exposure with-
out transmission, and of those jurisdictions, two states apply different criminal 
offences for exposure and for transmission.142 The remaining six jurisdictions 
do not prosecute exposure where no transmission has occurred. 
 In Victoria, where most of the prosecutions have taken place, “conduct en-
dangering life”143 is charged if transmission occurs, and “conduct endangering 
persons”144 is charged if transmission does not occur: 
22. A person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly engages in 
conduct that places or may place another person in danger of 
death is guilty of an indictable offence. Penalty: Level 5 impris-
onment (10 years maximum). 
23. A person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly engages in 
conduct that places or may place another person in danger of se-
rious injury is guilty of an indictable offence. Penalty: Level 6 
imprisonment (5 years maximum).145 
 Early cases distinguished between these offences by assessing the risk of 
potential harm;146 however, both offences were charged in cases of non-
transmission until 1998, when the accused in Mutemeri successfully chal-
lenged the assertion that exposure without transmission constituted a risk of 
      
2006 HCATrans 666, online: AusLII <www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/HCA 
Trans/2006/666.html>). 
142 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 22-23 [Crimes Act (Vic)]; Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act 1935 (SA) s 29 [CLCA (SA)]; Criminal Code (NT), ss 174C, 174D [Criminal 
Code (NT)]. I am assuming for the purposes of this paper that the legislation in the 
Northern Territory allows for criminalization of mere exposure although there 
have been no cases to date clarifying this interpretation 
143 Crimes Act (Vic), ibid s 22. 
144 Ibid s 23. 
145 Ibid ss 22-23. 
146 R v B (3 July 1995), unreported judgment (Vic SC (Crim Div)), Teague J estab-
lished that exposure without transmission of HIV was insufficient because the of-
fence in s 22 required an “appreciable danger of death,” rather than death being a 
“remote” or “mere” possibility (cited in Mutemeri v Cheesman, [1998] 4 VR 484 
at 489, 100 A Crim R 397 [Mutemeri cited to VR]).The judge found that the risk 
of transmitting HIV through unprotected anal intercourse, estimated in that case to 
be 1 in 200 or less, was remote. In a subsequent case, R v D (1 May 1996), unre-
ported judgment (Vic SC), Hampel J agreed with the holding in R v B that the risk 
should be an “appreciable” one (cited in Mutemeri at 489). 
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death.147 Mutemeri was initially convicted of 12 counts under section 22 for 
having unprotected sex with a woman who did not contract HIV. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Victoria found that the magistrate was not entitled to 
find, without evidence, that the accused’s conduct exposed the complainant to 
an appreciable risk of death.148 Justice Mandie in Mutemeri formulated the test 
as follows: “In addition to the subjective intent to engage in the conduct cou-
pled with recklessness as so defined, … [there must be] the objective intent of 
the reasonable person … which involves realisation by a reasonable person 
that the conduct would (or might) place another in danger of death.”149 Justice 
Mandie also commented that he had “some doubt as to whether the offence 
created by section 22 of the Crimes Act is properly to be construed as applica-
ble to cases other than those where a person is exposed to the risk of a death of 
some immediacy or imminence.”150  
 South Australia is the only Australian jurisdiction where the same offence 
is charged regardless of whether transmission occurred or not. This is in large 
part due to judicial formulation of the test for endangerment of life. The of-
fence is set out in section 29 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 
(SA): 
29. (1) Where a person, without lawful excuse, does an act or 
makes an omission—  
(a) knowing that the act or omission is likely to endanger the life 
of another; and 
(b) intending to endanger the life of another or being recklessly 
indifferent as to whether the life of another is endangered, that 
person is guilty of an offence.151 
 In R v Parenzee,152 the first case in South Australia to consider the non-
disclosure of HIV, the Supreme Court rejected the accused’s argument that 
“likely” in paragraph 29(1)(a) should be interpreted to mean more probable 
than not, thus creating a threshold of risk for culpability. Chief Justice Doyle 
found that the risk should be a real or substantial threat to life.153 Justice Bleby 
                                                   
147 Mutemeri, ibid. 
148 Ibid at 484, 491. 
149 Ibid at 491. 
150 Ibid at 493. 
151 CLCA (SA), supra note 142 s 29. 
152 R v Parenzee, [2008] SASC 245 [Parenzee]. 
153 Ibid at paras 73, 79 (dissenting in the result but on different issues). 
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pointed out that “the object of the likelihood [is] endangering life. It is not 
causing death nor is it, in this case, the likelihood of the victims contracting 
HIV.”154 He rephrased the test as follows: “life is endangered if it can be said 
that it is a reasonable possibility that death will ensue as a result of that unpro-
tected act of sexual intercourse.”155 Despite these different formulations of the 
test, all three judges agreed that there was evidence on which the jury was enti-
tled to find that engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse exposed the com-
plainants to sufficient risk, whether transmission occurred or not. 
 The issue of condom use is a relevant consideration in the three Australian 
jurisdictions that criminalize exposure without transmission (Victoria, South 
Australia, and the Northern Territory). As no charges have been laid for non-
disclosure where condoms were used–and no charges have been laid in the 
Northern Territory at all–the effect of condom use on culpability has not been 
clearly addressed. Nevertheless, in passing, judicial decisions have referred on-
ly to unprotected sex as culpable.156 This approach accords with the Australian 
public health message emphasizing protected sex, which has been remarkably 
successful in preventing the spread of HIV.157 
 Few courts in Australia have had occasion to confront numerical assess-
ments of risk. Where they have done so, they have considered the numerical 
risk to be low. In R v B, one of the first cases tried in Victoria, the judge found 
that the risk of transmitting HIV through unprotected anal intercourse, estimat-
ed in that case to be 1 in 200 or less, was remote.158 In R v D, a risk of 1 in 
1,000 to 1 in 2,000 was also seen as insufficiently high.159  
                                                   
154 Ibid at para 152. 
155 Ibid at para 155. 
156 See e.g. R v Kuoth [2010] VSCA 103 (“the appellant had been ordered … to di-
vulge his HIV positive status to any sexual partners and to use condoms during 
sexual intercourse. The fact that so soon afterwards he proceeded to disobey both 
aspects of that order is, of course, reflected in the charges which were laid” at para 
5). For a South Australian example, see Parenzee, supra note 152 at para 18 
where the trial judge charged the jury that “[t]he following elements must be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Firstly, the accused did an act or acts, namely, 
that he had unprotected sexual intercourse.”  
157 NAPWA Monograph, supra note 139 at 19. 
158 R v B, supra note 146 at para 5. 
159 R v D, supra note 146 at para 5. Victorian cases no longer turn on the assessment 
of risk, as different offences are charged for transmission and exposure. 
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D. Comparing Canada to England and Wales, New Zealand, and 
Australia 
 When one compares Canada to England and Wales, New Zealand, and 
Australia, several facts stand out. Perhaps most notable is the high number of 
prosecutions in Canada compared to the other jurisdictions. Over 100 prosecu-
tions have been documented in Canada as compared to 17 in England and 
Wales, 7 in New Zealand, and between 22 and 28 in Australia.  
 The other striking difference–which is likely related to the first–is that in 
England and Wales, and in six of Australia’s nine jurisdictions, cases are only 
prosecuted if transmission of the virus has occurred. In New Zealand and two 
Australian jurisdictions (Victoria and the Northern Territory), a different of-
fence is used depending on whether the virus is transmitted. In New Zealand, 
for example, the relatively minor offence of criminal nuisance is used where 
no transmission takes place, subjecting the accused to a maximum one year of 
imprisonment. Of all the jurisdictions considered in this paper, South Australia 
is the only one which has taken the Canadian approach of punishing exposure 
and transmission with the same offence.160 In Canada, the same charge of ag-
gravated (sexual) assault is typically used regardless of the nature of the decep-
tion, whether the virus is transmitted, or whether there is an isolated incident of 
non-disclosure or an ongoing course of non-disclosure. It is also notable that 
Canada is the only jurisdiction of those discussed that explicitly labels the ac-
cused as a sex offender due to the non-disclosure. In all other jurisdictions, the 
offence is characterized as the infliction of bodily harm, and not as non-
consensual sexual contact.161 These jurisdictions reveal that the Cuerrier ap-
proach is by no means the only way to address the criminalization of non-
disclosure. In fact, the current Canadian approach is anomalous when com-
pared to other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
 The assessments of risk that have accompanied the criminalization of ex-
posure without transmission in Canada have led some courts to find liability 
where the risk involved was extremely small. In Canada, a risk as low as 1 in 
                                                   
160 Only one case in South Australia (Parenzee, supra note 152) held that both expo-
sure and transmission are captured under the offence of “acts endangering life or 
creating risk of serious harm” (CLCA (SA), supra note 142 s 29). Regardless, no 
charges have yet been successfully prosecuted for exposure alone, although some 
cases are pending. 
161 Although in England and Wales this does not rule out a Sexual Offence Prevention 
Order (Sexual Offences Act, supra note 107). 
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10,000 has been found to constitute significant risk of bodily harm.162 Contrast 
this with the risks of 1 in 200163 and 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 2,000 found to be insuf-
ficient for criminal liability in the Australian state of Victoria.164 Although the 
assessment of risk is a question of fact in each case, it is striking that Canadian 
judges have reacted so harshly to risks that are too low to justify criminaliza-
tion elsewhere.  
IV. Is Cuerrier the Problem? 
 While some of the trial judgments to date leave room to find that any risk 
of transmitting HIV is sufficient to ground liability, the Manitoba Court of Ap-
peal in Mabior, the Québec Court of Appeal in DC, and the trial decision in 
JAT reflect a movement towards limiting criminal liability to cases involving a 
real, quantifiable “significant risk of serious harm.” Nevertheless, the potential 
for over-criminalization remains because the definition of such a risk continues 
to be elusive.  
 In her concurring minority judgment in Cuerrier, Justice McLachlin pre-
dicted the difficulties of applying the “significant risk of bodily harm” test: 
When is a risk significant enough to qualify conduct as crimi-
nal? In whose eyes is “significance” to be determined—the vic-
tim’s, the accused’s or the judge’s? What is the ambit of “seri-
ous bodily harm”? Can a bright line be drawn between psycho-
logical harm and bodily harm, when the former may lead to de-
pression, self-destructive behaviour and in extreme cases sui-
cide? The criminal law must be certain. If it is uncertain, it can-
not deter inappropriate conduct and loses its raison d’être. 
Equally serious, it becomes unfair. … Finally, Cory J.’s limita-
tion of the new crime to significant and serious risk of harm 
amounts to making an ad hoc choice of where the line between 
lawful conduct and unlawful conduct should be drawn. This 
Court, per Lamer C.J., has warned that making ad hoc choices is 
properly the task of the legislatures, not the courts…165 
The problems Justice McLachlin identified have been played out in the appli-
cation of Cuerrier and invite a critical re-examination of that case. Studies also 
indicate that there is uncertainty amongst persons with HIV as to what behav-
                                                   
162 DC (CQ), supra note 28 although this finding was recently reversed on appeal (DC 
(CA), supra note 4). See Mabior (CA) supra note 5. 
163 R v B, supra note 146 at 489. 
164 R v D, supra note 146 at 489. 
165 Supra note 2 at para 48. 
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iour is criminal and what their legal responsibilities are with respect to disclo-
sure.166 
  There are at least two broad categories of problems relating to Cuerrier. 
First, every case of non-disclosure will inevitably be prosecuted as, at a mini-
mum, aggravated assault or aggravated sexual assault. There is no room for 
lesser levels of culpability even where no bodily harm is done to the complain-
ant or where there is only one isolated incident of non-disclosure. Second, 
Cuerrier creates uncertainty about what kinds of harm are sufficient both to 
negate consent and to endanger life. Because these cases have become so de-
pendent on expert evidence and individual risk assessment, it is difficult to 
predict outcomes in particular cases. Even courts of appeal are wary of making 
definitive statements regarding viral load or condom use, leaving it to triers of 
fact to assess whether the level of risk is significant. 167 Thus, there is a trou-
bling lack of predictability in an area of the law that cries out for certainty.  
A.  Reconsidering Aggravated (Sexual) Assault  
 Many HIV non-disclosure cases involve charges of aggravated sexual as-
sault, although others, including the two leading cases from the Supreme Court 
of Canada,168 involve charges of aggravated assault. It is difficult to determine 
how these charging decisions are being made for virtually identical conduct. 
This disparity may arise in part because the Court in Cuerrier characterized the 
underlying assault as a sexual assault. Thus, the addition of the aggravating 
circumstance logically leads to a charge of aggravated sexual assault, even 
though Cuerrier involved aggravated assault.  
 Aggravated sexual assault carries a maximum life sentence, whereas the 
maximum for aggravated assault is 14 years.169 This is complicated further by 
the fact that aggravated sexual assault is a designated offence under section 
490.011(1) of the Criminal Code, for the purpose of Canada’s sex offender 
registration law,170 whereas aggravated assault is not. This distinction has ex-
isted only since 15 December 2004, when SOIRA came into force, and thus 
                                                   
166 Mykhalovskiy, Betteridge & McLay, supra note 103 at 12. 
167 Mabior (CA), supra note 5; DC (CA), supra note 4. 
168 Cuerrier, supra note 2; Williams, supra note 77. 
169 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 268(2), 273(2). 
170 Sex Offender Information Registration Act, SC 2004, c 10, proclaimed in force 15 
December 2004, SI/2004-157, (2004) C Gaz II, 2021 [SOIRA]. 
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cannot fully explain the blurring of these two offences in the HIV cases.171 
While the distinction between the offences could now provide a reason for 
charging aggravated sexual assault (and for using aggravated sexual assault 
charges as a vehicle for plea bargaining down to aggravated assault), the sex 
offender registry does not appear to explain how and why these offences have 
come to be used interchangeably. It is true, however, that most, though not all 
recent cases appear to involve charges of aggravated sexual assault.  
 This paper assumes that both these charges will continue to be laid until 
the Supreme Court or Parliament directs otherwise. The following discussion 
focuses on the endangerment of life component, which is common to both of 
these aggravated assault offences. To simplify the discussion in this section, I 
use the term “aggravated assault,” but with the awareness that, in many cases, 
aggravated sexual assault is charged.  
 Aggravated assault is the most serious form of assault in Canadian law. It 
applies to an accused who wounds, maims, disfigures, or endangers the life of 
the complainant in the course of an assault. Prior to the HIV transmission cas-
es, endangerment of life applied primarily to assaults that resulted in serious 
physical harm–harm more significant than that covered by assault causing bod-
ily harm.172 Aggravated assault is a consequence crime; it requires a low level 
of fault because of the seriousness of the harm caused. The actus reus has been 
described as “an assault (the act)–a consequent endangering of the life of the 
complainant (the result).”173 In R v Creighton, the Supreme Court of Canada 
endorsed the interpretation of endangerment as a harm that results from the as-
sault.174 Prior to Cuerrier, there was conflicting case law on whether endan-
germent of life can be established when there is no bodily harm to the victim. 
Although courts often stated that, in theory, endangerment of life could occur 
without any physical harm being caused, such statements were usually made in 
context of cases where serious harm had been caused and thus were not neces-
sary for the decision.175 This issue was addressed in R v De Freitas,176 where 
                                                   
171 See e.g. Cuerrier, supra note 2; Williams, supra note 77. Both cases predated the 
sex offender registry. 
172 See e.g. R v APP, 2008 ONCJ 196, 77 WCB (2d) 117 (a boy set fire to a girl’s 
breasts causing third degree burns; the mild scarring and possible nerve damage 
constituted bodily harm but was insufficient to warrant an aggravated assault con-
viction). 
173 R v L(SR) (1992), 11 OR (3d) 271, 76 CCC (3d) 502 (ONCA)  [L(SR)]. 
174 [1993] 3 SCR 3, citing L(SR), ibid with approval. 
175 An exception to this can be found in R v Melaragni (1992), 75 CCC (3d) 546, 17 
WCB (2d) 148 (Ont Gen Div) where the court held that the accused shooting two 
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the accused had attempted, unsuccessfully, to stab a police officer with a knife. 
He was acquitted of aggravated assault. The Manitoba Court of Appeal held 
that: 
The use of a weapon in an assault will almost always create a 
risk of the victim being wounded, maimed or disfigured or his or 
her life endangered. Yet the legislation does not place an assault 
with a weapon in the category of aggravated assault. For this to 
happen, the risk must become reality. The victim must actually 
be wounded, maimed or disfigured or his or her life endangered. 
‘Endangers the life of the complainant’ is thus, in my view, in-
tended to be as much a consequence of the assault as ‘wounds, 
maims or disfigures.’  
…  
Most assaults with a weapon have such potential at their incep-
tion, but do not qualify as an aggravated assault because the po-
tential is unrealized when the assault ends.177  
The Court of Appeal in De Freitas did acknowledge that there could be in-
stances where endangerment may be proven in the absence of harm. In particu-
lar, the Court of Appeal agreed with the examples from the trial decision in R v 
Melaragni:  
For example, if D. and V. are standing on a 20th-floor balcony 
and D. pushes V., causing V. to go over the railing, but V. mi-
raculously holds on and is rescued before falling, can it be 
doubted that D.’s common assault endangered the life of V.? In 
this example, D. has assaulted V. and the assault has endangered 
V.’s life even though V. suffered no bodily injury. The same 
could be said if D. pushed V. into a busy intersection in the face 
of oncoming vehicular traffic. Assuming that an alert motorist 
was able to avoid striking V., can it be doubted that V.’s life was 
endangered? 
      
bullets into the driver’s seat of a car where the victims were located could consti-
tute aggravated assault even though the only injury caused was a small scratch to 
one victim. For a discussion of these cases see Ferguson, supra note 23 at 52-55 
who takes the opposite view to the one expressed in this paper. 
176 R v De Freitas, [1999] 7 WWR 643 at para 12, 134 ManR (2d) 78 (CA) [De 
Freitas].  
177 Ibid at paras 12, 14. 
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 In my opinion, the assaults in those examples qualify as ag-
gravated assaults because endangerment to life is the conse-
quence of the completed assault.178 
 In Cuerrier it was assumed, without careful analysis, that bodily harm is 
not required to establish endangerment of life because the risk of contracting 
HIV was always sufficient. Justice Cory held that “it is not necessary to estab-
lish that the complainants were in fact infected with the virus. There is no pre-
requisite that any harm must actually have resulted.”179 Following Cuerrier, 
the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Mabior explicitly stated that endangering life 
can occur “without any bodily harm actually occurring to the victim.”180 Cuer-
rier changed the focus of aggravated assault by shifting the emphasis for en-
dangerment from actual harm to risk of harm, even where no bodily harm to 
the complainant is caused. Endangering life was taken out of the context of as-
saults that wound, maim, or disfigure, and put into the context of harm that 
may not actually materialize.181 Convicting someone who has not transmitted 
HIV of either of these serious consequence crimes may be overreaching the 
appropriate boundaries of both aggravated assault and aggravated sexual as-
sault. 
 I am not suggesting that aggravated assault can never be established in the 
absence of bodily harm. If a person is pushed into oncoming traffic but mi-
raculously escapes harm, the endangerment of life is direct and immediate. 
The endangerment of life in the non-disclosure context is much more tenuous. 
First, the virus must be transmitted; this is never more likely than not. Second, 
given our improved treatment of HIV/AIDS and life expectancies that ap-
proach normal, the endangerment of life becomes tenuous even where the vi-
rus has been transmitted. As the Mabior expert witness report stated, most 
                                                   
178 Ibid at paras 13-14, citing Melaragni, supra note 175. 
179 Cuerrier, supra note 2 at para 95. 
180 Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 140. 
181 The associated words rule of statutory interpretation, noscitur a sociis, states that 
“when two or more terms linked by ‘and’ or ‘or’ serve an analogous grammatical 
and logical function within a provision… [t]his parallelism invites the reader to 
look for a common feature among the terms. This feature is then relied on to re-
solve ambiguity or limit the scope of the terms.” Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the 
Construction of Statutes, 5th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2008) at 227. Thus it 
could be argued that the words “endanger life” should be read in light of the words 
that precede it, wounding or maiming, both of which require some actual harm. 
The counter-argument is the presumption against tautology: Parliament does not 
include unnecessary language (Sullivan at 210-213). 
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HIV-positive people who comply with treatment will die of a cause unrelated 
to AIDS.182 Where there is no transmission, the endangerment is simply too 
remote.  
 There are also compelling public policy reasons to be cautious about over-
prosecution of non-disclosure183 which do not apply to situations where some-
one is pushed off a balcony or hurled into oncoming traffic. This is not to trivi-
alize the psychological harm to the complainant when he or she learns of the 
accused’s HIV status. However, the harm is much greater where the complain-
ant contracts HIV than where he or she does not.  It is the increased harm that 
warrants labelling the assault “aggravated.” 
 Even in R v Williams, in which the Supreme Court of Canada declined to 
find aggravated assault because it was not proven that the virus had been 
transmitted after the accused learned of his infection, the Court recognized that 
aggravated assault focuses on the consequences of the crime, not on the assault 
itself: 
Section 268(1) applies to a wide variety of human activity, and 
its interpretation should not be skewed to accommodate the hard 
facts of this case. Its focus should continue to be, as in the past, 
on the nature of the consequences rather than on the nature of 
the assault.184  
I would argue, therefore, that aggravated assault charges should be limited to 
cases in which the virus is transmitted. While this is open to the criticism that 
transmission may be largely a matter of chance, we often differentiate degrees 
of culpability in criminal law by the harm caused: an assault may become 
manslaughter if the victim dies, even though the mens rea remains the same. 
  The Cuerrier analysis conflates sexual assault with aggravated sexual as-
sault. A significant risk of serious bodily harm is required to negate consent 
and thus prove the crime of sexual assault. Yet once the Crown proves sexual 
assault, it automatically proves aggravated sexual assault as well. This is be-
cause the test for endangerment of life is virtually identical to the test for estab-
                                                   
182 See e.g. Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration, “Causes of Death in HIV-1-
Infected Patients Treated With Antiretroviral Therapy, 1996-2006: Collaborative 
Analysis of 13 HIV Cohort Studies” (2010) 50:10 Clinical Infectious Diseases 
1387 at 1390; Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 63. 
183 See Grant, “The Boundaries of the Criminal Law”, supra note 6; Grant, “Rethink-
ing Risk” supra note 38. 
184 Supra note 77 at para 58. 
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lishing fraud.185 In the HIV non-disclosure context, these tests are so similar 
they almost always overlap. Thus, every sexual assault of this nature will con-
stitute aggravated sexual assault because it will endanger life. The Cuerrier 
test renders conviction for lesser-included offences unlikely.  There is no room 
for gradations of blameworthiness, as envisioned by the existence of the two 
offences.  
 Currently, accused persons are charged with one of two aggravated assault 
offences, virtually interchangeably. The cases run a wide gamut of culpability. 
In R v DC, there was one act of unprotected intercourse before the accused dis-
closed her HIV-positive status to the complainant two months after meeting 
him.186 Several weeks after the disclosure, the complainant reinitiated contact 
and continued the relationship with the accused for four years. The relationship 
ended badly, and charges were subsequently laid for that one act of unprotect-
ed intercourse four years earlier. The accused’s viral load was undetectable at 
the time of the unprotected intercourse, and the risk that she would transmit the 
virus to the complainant was stated to be 1 in 10,000. The complainant did not 
contract HIV, yet the accused was convicted of aggravated assault and sexual 
assault. By contrast, in R v JML,187 the accused deliberately misled the com-
plainant and went so far as to fabricate a laboratory requisition form indicating 
that he was HIV-negative when, in fact, he knew that he was HIV-positive. In 
R v Nduwayo, the virus was transmitted to several complainants, including one 
who became pregnant. 188 In another Ontario case, Carl Leone transmitted HIV 
to five complainants, and exposed a further ten sexual partners to the risk of 
contracting HIV.189 Although differences in culpability can be taken into ac-
count in sentencing, I would argue that the most serious offence should be re-
served for the most serious cases involving transmission in the context of a 
sustained course of conduct, such as those demonstrated by Leone and Ndu-
wayo. Furthermore, it is time to consider whether sexual assault is the most 
appropriate charge in these cases or whether the focus should be on the harm 
caused by transmission and not the sexual nature of the activity that was the 
vehicle for transmission. An offence like unlawfully causing bodily harm, 
found in section 269 of the Criminal Code, might better capture the nature of 
the offence and, as a hybrid offence, has a more reasonable range of penalties 
                                                   
185 JAT, supra note 4. 
186 DC (CQ), supra note 28. 
187 2007 BCPC 341. 
188 Supra note 84.  
189 “Criminal Law and HIV Transmission or Exposure: Seen New Cases” (2008) 13:1 
HIV/AIDS Policy and Law 50 at 51. 
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to reflect the varying culpability found in these cases.190 Alternatively, criminal 
negligence causing bodily harm, in section 221, is another option which focus-
es on the consequence in the context of wanton or reckless disregard for the 
life or safety of the complainant.191 
 It is difficult to extract a requirement that there be a pattern of non-
disclosure from the elements of aggravated assault and its minimal definition 
of fault. It is here that the English experience with prosecutorial guidelines is 
instructive. Prosecutorial guidelines should rule out prosecuting cases like DC, 
where there is one isolated act of non-disclosure, followed by years of respon-
sible sexual behaviour, and no transmission. Rather, prosecution should focus 
on cases like Leone or Nduwayo, where there is a clear pattern of reckless dis-
regard for the potential harm to one or more complainants and a likelihood that 
such behaviour will persist without the intervention of criminal law.192  
B. Certainty 
 Since Cuerrier, we have seen inconsistency in the case law, with different 
courts and juries giving different meaning to “significant risk.” As predicted 
by Justice McLachlin in Cuerrier, the significant risk threshold has not been 
precise enough for consistent judicial application, and there is insufficient cer-
tainty to guide individual behaviour.  
 In the earlier cases, courts appeared to use the significant risk test to distin-
guish between protected and unprotected sex, but even this line was not drawn 
consistently.193 Mekonnen sidestepped the entire issue and did not consider 
risk, convicting the accused of aggravated sexual assault, though condoms 
were used consistently.194 Later cases continue to misapply the test. In Mabior 
and DC, 195 the trial judges equated significant risk with any risk.196 While the-
                                                   
190 Supra note 169. The maximum sentence for unlawfully causing bodily harm is 10 
years (on indictment) and 18 months (on summary conviction). One of the diffi-
culties with unlawfully causing bodily harm in this context is the requirement 
from R v DeSousa of an underlying unlawful act [1992] 2 SCR 944 [DeSousa].  
191 Ibid. 
192 As I have argued elsewhere, it is also essential that public health options be ex-
hausted before there is resort to the criminal law (Grant, “The Boundaries of the 
Criminal Law”, supra note 6). 
193 See e.g. Edwards, supra note 26. 
194 Supra note 34 at paras 9, 40, 52, 58. 
195 DC (CQ), supra note 28. 
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se cases have both been reversed on appeal, even the appellate judgments in-
vite uncertainty: 
… no comprehensive statement can be made about the impact of 
low viral loads on the question of risk. Each case depends on the 
facts regarding the particular accused, and each case will depend 
on the state of the medical evidence at the time and the manner 
in which it is presented in that particular case.197 
 Recent cases have interpreted Cuerrier to mean that it is for the trier of fact 
to assess risk in each case, even where the intercourse was protected or where 
other circumstances rendered the risk extremely low. This has resulted in un-
predictability in the application of the law and possible over-extension of 
Cuerrier. In JT, the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected the argument 
that Cuerrier set a benchmark level of risk and held that risks must be assessed 
in each individual case, even where condoms were used or other circumstances 
rendered the risk below that posed by protected sex.198 In JAT, the trial deci-
sion after JT, the judge sought a balanced approach: 
A significant risk means a risk that is of a magnitude great 
enough to be considered important. … There are two compo-
nents to the proof of significant risk of harm. There must be sig-
nificant risk, and the potential consequences must be serious 
bodily harm. … It is no longer the case that all people infected 
with the virus will eventually develop AIDS and die premature-
ly. This is important because the nature of the harm necessarily 
affects the threshold of significance required to establish depri-
vation. As the magnitude of the harm goes up, the threshold of 
probability that will be considered significant goes down.199 
 Aware of the uncertainty inherent in the Cuerrier test, the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal in Mabior suggested that the Supreme Court of Canada consider re-
visiting the law in this area: 
Again, with respect to viral loads, the ability to show that an ac-
cused had a common infection or an STD at the time of sex that 
might have led to a spike in the viral load may very well prove 
      
196 Mabior (QB), supra note 37 at para 134. This error was pointed out by the Manito-
ba Court of Appeal: Mabior (CA) supra note 5 at paras 10, 19. 
197 Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 113 cited with approval in DC (CA), supra note 
4 at para 113. 
198 JT, supra note 29. 
199 JAT, supra note 4 at paras 56, 77-78. 
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elusive. In light of these concerns and the developments in the 
science, the Supreme Court may wish to consider revisiting the 
test in Cuerrier to provide all parties with more certainty.200  
 Since it is a matter for the trier of fact, judges may leave it to juries to de-
cide whether or not the use of a condom negates the significant risk of bodily 
harm. Juries must, first, assess the risk of protected sex from expert evidence, 
which may vary somewhat from case to case; second, they must determine 
whether that risk is sufficiently serious to negate consent. This could lead to 
the problematic situation where protected sex is criminalized for one individu-
al and not for another, or in one jurisdiction and not in another.  
 One of the justifications offered for the criminalization of non-disclosure 
of HIV status is that it deters non-disclosure and encourages persons who are 
HIV-positive to act responsibly in sexual activity.201 But given the jurispru-
dence, it is impossible to advise someone who is HIV-positive as to their legal 
responsibility. While the simplest position would be to say one must always 
disclose, this does not appear to be the current state of the law. How would a 
lawyer or public health official answer questions such as: (i) “Do I need to dis-
close if I use a condom?”; (ii) “Can non-disclosure result in criminal liability if 
I have an undetectable viral load?”; or (iii) “What if the sexual activity we are 
engaging in is low risk?” The courts interpreting Cuerrier have not reached a 
consensus on these questions, and persons with HIV are left with uncertainty, 
thus undermining the deterrence rationale.202 
C. Cuerrier and Over-Criminalization  
 Lower courts often adopt the test from Cuerrier without question. What 
tends to get lost from that decision is the Supreme Court’s concern that crimi-
nalization be approached with caution, most clearly recognized by Justice 
McLachlin: 
The broad extensions of the law proposed by my colleagues may 
also have an adverse impact on the fight to reduce the spread of 
HIV and other serious sexually transmitted diseases. Public 
health workers argue that encouraging people to come forward 
for testing and treatment is the key to preventing the spread of 
HIV and similar diseases, and that broad criminal sanctions are 
                                                   
200Mabior (CA), supra note 5 at para 152. The Québec Court of Appeal in DC echoed 
this request (supra note 4 at para 121). 
201 See Grant, “The Boundaries of the Criminal Law”, supra note 6. 
202 Mykhalovskiy, Betteridge & McLay, supra note 103 at 11. 
2011 
 
THE PROSECUTION OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF HIV IN CANADA: 
TIME TO RETHINK CUERRIER 
53 
 
 
unlikely to be effective. Criminalizing a broad range of HIV re-
lated conduct will only impair such efforts. Moreover, because 
homosexuals, intravenous drug users, sex trade workers, prison-
ers, and people with disabilities are those most at risk of con-
tracting HIV, the burden of criminal sanctions will impact most 
heavily on members of these already marginalized groups. The 
material before the Court suggests that a blanket duty to disclose 
may drive those with the disease underground.203 
Justice McLachlin’s fears about the uneven application of the law to certain 
populations were prescient, although not all the groups she identified have 
been singled out thus far. A recent Ontario study has shed light on the de-
mographics surrounding prosecutions for non-disclosure.204 Not surprisingly, 
91% of those charged in Canada for failing to disclose their HIV status are 
men. Seventy-two percent of the charges laid are for men not disclosing their 
status to women. Overall, 65% of all Canadians charged are men alleged to 
have not disclosed to female sexual partners, although the authors note that 
there has been a recent trend towards charging men who have sex with men.205 
At 38% of all accused, Caucasian men still form the majority of those charged. 
Thirty-three percent of the cases involved black accused. However, race cuts 
across different types of prosecutions. Black men account for almost 50% of 
heterosexual men who have been charged since 2004, while the majority of the 
same-sex cases involve Caucasian men. 
 Contrary to Justice McLachlin’s expectations, gay and bisexual men ap-
pear to be under-represented in terms of accused persons, given the prevalence 
of HIV in those populations. The Ontario study’s authors suggest that gay and 
bisexual populations may have a greater acceptance of HIV-related risks than 
do the women who accuse heterosexual sexual partners of non-disclosure. The 
authors further suggest that gay men “may also be less inclined than female 
complainants to understand themselves to have been ‘victimized’ or to proceed 
with complaints to the police in circumstances in which non-disclosure has oc-
curred.”206 Some have argued that non-disclosure prosecutions have the poten-
tial to push gay men towards more casual sexual encounters where prosecution 
                                                   
203 Cuerrier, supra note 2 at para 55. 
204 Mykhalovskiy, Betteridge & McLay, supra note 103 at 43. 
205 Ibid at 11. See also Adam McDowell, supra note 104.  
206 Mykhalovskiy, Betteridge & McLay, supra note 103 at 43. 
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is less likely and disclosure is not expected by the parties involved.207 Police 
officers and prosecutors may also take a different approach to laying charges 
when complaints are received from gay men as opposed to heterosexual wom-
en. Society may be more likely to see women as victims of predatory men, 
whereas gay men are more likely to be seen as complicit in the acquisition of 
the virus.  The gendered basis of sexual assault in the HIV nondisclosure con-
text is complicated because of the higher proportion of male complainants than 
in sexual assault generally and because of the potential for certain groups of 
women to be targeted for prosecution.   
 The authors of the Ontario study note that there has been a significant 
jump in the number of prosecutions since 2004. They describe the data as fol-
lows: 
While our data support the claim that cases are increasing over 
time, they do not indicate a gradual increase. Rather, they show 
a long period of relative inactivity, with only a few criminal cas-
es per year (with the exception of 1999 the year following the 
Cuerrier decision), followed by a sharp increase in annual cases 
in 2004 that is sustained until 2009. Rather than a criminaliza-
tion creep, the trend in criminal cases follows a two-phase pro-
cess involving a long period of inactivity followed by a sus-
tained increase.208 
The authors identify 104 cases in which 98 accused persons were charged with 
criminal offences relating to non-disclosure. During the first 14 years for 
which data are available, the number of cases ranged from zero to six per year. 
In 2004, the number went up to nine and peaked in 2006 at 16. Approximately 
65% of all criminal cases have occurred between 2004 and 2009.209 Thus, 
while our ability to manage HIV has improved, and while our understanding of 
the risks involved with different types of sexual activity has grown, there has 
still been an increase in the rate of non-disclosure prosecutions. The study also 
points out that in at least 38% of all convictions across Canada, there is no al-
legation that HIV was transmitted. In 22% of the cases, transmission was al-
leged, and in 18% of the cases some complainants were infected while others 
were not. For the remaining 22% the authors were unable to determine wheth-
                                                   
207 See e.g. Gary Marks, Scott Burris & Thomas A Peterman, “Reducing Sexual 
Transmission of HIV From Those who Know They are Infected: The Need for 
Personal and Collective Responsibility” (1999) 13:3 AIDS 297. 
208 Mykhalovskiy, Betteridge & McLay, supra note 103 at 13. 
209 Ibid at 44. 
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er transmission took place.210 It is likely that the unknown category includes 
both cases of transmission and non-transmission, suggesting that in more than 
40% of the cases, no bodily harm was done to the complainant. At the same 
time, there is an emerging body of social science evidence that suggests that 
the criminalization of non-disclosure does not necessarily shape the behaviour 
of those who are HIV-positive.211 
 In Cuerrier, Justice Cory wrote about the importance of protecting people 
from “high-risk” sexual behaviours.212 Couple this with his statement that pro-
tected sex would probably not create a significantly serious risk, and one sees 
that the Court did not intend to criminalize all risk. The trial judge in JAT rec-
ognized that Cuerrier did not intend to criminalize every exposure, and she 
pointed out the impact of scientific advances in HIV medication on the deci-
sion in Cuerrier. She was not satisfied “that a [12 in 10,000] risk of transmis-
sion of the virus that, while still a serious lifelong harm, is now largely treata-
ble, constitutes endangerment to life. It follows that the Crown had not proved 
aggravated sexual assault.”213 She based her decision, in part, on recent ad-
vances in treatment for HIV using antiretroviral medications: 
HIV is no longer synonymous with AIDS and premature death. 
According to Dr. Murphy, those living with HIV who receive 
treatment have a normal life expectancy. These projections are 
necessarily based on extrapolation because antiretroviral drugs 
have only been available since 1987. Dr. Murphy was confident, 
however, that this is a realistic projection given that the drugs 
used to treat HIV have become increasingly less toxic and more 
targeted since their development 23 years ago.214 
The trial judge concluded by noting that the accused’s conduct was reprehen-
sible but not criminal, echoing the exhortation from Cuerrier to approach 
criminalization cautiously: 
I should not be taken to condone the behaviour of the accused. 
He had a moral obligation to disclose his HIV-positive status to 
                                                   
210 Ibid at 44. 
211 See e.g. Scott Burris et al, “Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An 
Empirical Trial” (2007) 39 Ariz St LJ 467.  
212 Cuerrier, supra note 2 at para 141. 
213 JAT, supra note 4 at para 58.  
214 Ibid at para 22. The extended life expectancy of HIV-positive persons was also 
recognized in Wright, supra note 4 at para 9, but was not applied to remove culpa-
bility in that case. 
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his partner and to give the complainant the opportunity to as-
sume or reject the risk involved in sexual activity with the ac-
cused, no matter how small. But not every immoral or reprehen-
sible act engages the heavy hand of the criminal law. Aggravat-
ed sexual assault is a most serious offence–a person convicted of 
this charge is liable to imprisonment for life, the harshest penalty 
provided for in law. Only behaviour that puts a complainant at 
significant risk of serious bodily harm will suffice to turn what 
would otherwise be a consensual activity into an aggravated 
sexual assault. In my view, a risk of transmission of HIV of 
0.12% falls short of that standard.215 
 While the appellate decisions in Mabior and DC–and the trial judgment in 
JAT–demonstrate a positive trend towards a more cautious approach to crimi-
nalization, the significant risk of serious bodily harm test still allows for un-
predictability and inconsistency. 
V. Future Directions   
 It is time to rethink Cuerrier. A serious consequence crime is not appropri-
ate where the virus is not transmitted. The experience of England and Wales, 
Australia, and New Zealand offer at least two options for consideration in 
Canada. First, we could adopt the English position (also followed in six Aus-
tralian jurisdictions) where prosecutions are undertaken only if the virus has 
been transmitted. In England and Wales, for example, exposure without trans-
mission is criminalized only where there is an actual intent to transmit the vi-
rus and there have been no such cases to date. Such an approach would remove 
the difficulty that surrounds issues of condom use and viral load, shifting the 
focus from risk to actual harm. There has never been a prosecution in Canada 
where the virus was transmitted despite condom use or in the context of an un-
detectable viral load. Only prosecuting cases involving transmission would be 
a major departure from the Cuerrier approach in Canada, but it could cut our 
rate of prosecution by as much as 40%. The concern with this approach is that 
it may not capture those who repeatedly expose their partners to risk without 
disclosure, but who have, fortuitously, not transmitted the virus.   
 This is why the second approach, used in New Zealand and two Australian 
states, is more appropriate for Canada. The New Zealand approach recognizes 
that causing serious harm to an individual warrants a more serious offence than 
cases in which no harm is caused. Where no transmission has occurred, a less 
serious offence, such as simple (sexual) assault or common nuisance is more 
appropriate than aggravated (sexual) assault. Common nuisance was some-
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times utilized in pre-Cuerrier prosecutions.216 Common nuisance in section 
180 of the Criminal Code, with a maximum sentence of two years, is a close 
match to the New Zealand nuisance offence.217 Conviction for common nui-
sance would not label the individual a sex offender and would reflect the ap-
proach taken in other jurisdictions examined in this paper that treat non-
disclosure as an offence related to bodily harm rather than to sexual assault. In 
New Zealand, the practice of charging a less serious offence with a maximum 
sentence of one year where transmission does not occur, and the explicit provi-
sion that reasonable safeguards will negate liability, provide for a cautious and 
more nuanced approach to criminalization than the blanket application of ag-
gravated assault or aggravated sexual assault that occurs in Canada. 
 Under Canadian law it is acceptable to convict persons who cause more 
severe harm of a more serious offence, even if they have the same mental state 
as those who do not cause harm. Gradations of offences would acknowledge 
that the transmission of HIV to the complainant matters. The Supreme Court 
of Canada has acknowledged the legitimacy of punishing offences with the 
same level of fault more seriously if they lead to a particular harm: 
Conduct may fortuitously result in more or less serious conse-
quences depending on the circumstances in which the conse-
quences arise. The same act of assault may injure one person but 
not another. The implicit rationale of the law in this area is that it 
is acceptable to distinguish between criminal responsibility for 
equally reprehensible acts on the basis of the harm that is actual-
ly caused. This is reflected in the creation of higher maximum 
penalties for offences with more serious consequences. Courts 
and legislators acknowledge the harm actually caused by con-
cluding that in otherwise equal cases a more serious conse-
quence will dictate a more serious response.218 
                                                   
216 In fact, common nuisance was the first charge ever laid in a Canadian non-
disclosure case where transmission occurred. See R v Summer, (1989) 98 AR 191, 
AJ No 784 (QL) (Alta Prov Ct), aff’d  68 Alta LR (2d) 303, 99 AR 29, 73 CR (3d) 
32, [1989] AJ No 820 (CA) (two of the complainants tested positive for HIV and 
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Recognizing the additional harm to the complainant where the virus is trans-
mitted may warrant an aggravated assault charge.219 In my view, we should 
limit liability for such a serious offence to cases where it can be proven that the 
accused transmitted the virus to the complainant. While it is true that this posi-
tion requires causation to be proved the Crown should have a heavy burden in 
proving this very serious charge. 
 Furthermore, it is questionable whether all cases of non-disclosure should 
give rise to criminal liability. Prosecutors need to be cautious in their exercise 
of discretion before laying charges for isolated acts of non-disclosure where no 
transmission occurs. The English prosecutorial guidelines are instructive here. 
They provide that the level of fault or recklessness required will only be met 
where there is an ongoing course of non-disclosure. Similarly, where reasona-
ble precautions are taken, criminal charges are not appropriate: reasonably 
careful use of a condom should preclude prosecution. It may be necessary to 
clarify what careful condom use includes, as the Manitoba Court of Appeal in 
Mabior has begun to do. That Court, for example, stated that where a condom 
breaks or falls off it is the same as if no condom were used and immediate dis-
closure is required.220 Similarly, it is arguable that where tests indicate that the 
accused’s viral load was undetectable and the virus was not transmitted, crimi-
nal prosecution is not appropriate.  
 The changes proposed here would require either legislative action, which 
seems unlikely, or a reconsideration of Cuerrier by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada. With the changing picture of HIV/AIDS in Canada and increased under-
standing of transmission risks, Mabior and DC provide the Supreme Court 
with an excellent opportunity to begin this process. 
Conclusion 
 It is important to bear in mind that every accused person in these cases is a 
member of a highly stigmatized and disadvantaged group in Canadian society. 
This is not intended to justify non-disclosure but rather to suggest that crimi-
nalization must be approached with great caution because of the danger of fur-
ther marginalizing persons with HIV.   
                                                   
219 As stated above, I believe a nonsexual offence like unlawfully causing bodily 
harm, or even aggravated assault, better reflects the nature of the harm where the 
virus is transmitted than aggravated sexual assault. 
220 Mabior (CA) supra note 5 at para 97. Compare “Toronto woman gets house arrest 
for failing to disclose HIV status to man” Canadian Press (20 November 2009) 
(Robin Lee St Clair disclosed her status immediately after a condom broke during 
sex, and pled guilty to sexual assault). 
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 The current law is not functional. The Cuerrier test does not help to draw 
manageable lines regarding who should be subject to criminal liability and 
who should not. It does not provide a clear standard that leads to predictable 
results, and the approach to endangerment has resulted in a trend towards over-
criminalization of individuals who do not transmit the virus. The law should 
encourage behaviour that reduces the risk of HIV transmission, such as the use 
of condoms and low-risk sexual practices. Over-reliance on disclosure shifts 
the focus away from the consequences that we are trying to avoid. It also as-
sumes that the accused knows his or her HIV status and that his or her sexual 
partner will withhold consent once disclosure takes place. The consistent use 
of condoms and maintenance of an undetectable viral load are more effective 
means of curbing sexual transmission than relying on disclosure and a subse-
quent denial of consent. The law in Canada must both support effective public 
health messages by encouraging risk-reducing behaviour and recognize the ac-
tual harm caused by transmission of HIV by reserving the most serious offenc-
es for cases where the most severe harm has been caused. 
 Canada has taken an extremely harsh approach to prosecuting non-
disclosure of HIV-positive status. No distinction is made between cases in 
which the virus is transmitted and those in which it is not. It is time to rethink 
this blanket approach. While both the approach taken in England and Wales 
(of only prosecuting cases where transmission results), and that of New Zea-
land (where a much less serious offence is charged if no transmission results) 
are preferable to the Canadian approach, I would argue that the New Zealand 
approach is most suitable for Canada.  Aggravated assault offences should be 
reserved for cases where the virus has been transmitted. Where there is a pat-
tern of non-disclosure, and no transmission, less serious criminal offences are 
more appropriate.  The Canadian approach to date–uncertain, inconsistent, and 
out of step with other Commonwealth jurisdictions–cries out for reconsidera-
tion. 
 
